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This thesis covers, in its four chapters, a diverse set of topics linked to the current
research on complex systems. For their nature, these systems cannot be studied only with
the paradigms and the toolboxes of a single science. They require a multi-disciplinary
approach able to gather the insights and techniques from different domains. Therefore, in
order to provide the reader with a general overview of our work, we will first introduce the
logical connections between the different chapters and then we will explain the rationales,
the intuitions and the methodologies that characterize each contribution.
The main focus of this thesis is the analysis of socio-economic systems characterized by
the presence of many heterogeneous agents, each endowed with a piece of information (an
opinion, a belief or a preference), which can be shared with some of the other members of
the population. Since agents interact mainly with their first order social ”neighborhood”,
the setups that we study as characterized as distributed systems.
Creating micro founded dynamic models involving localized interactions among many
heterogeneous agents is a new trend in social sciences and economics that has the objective
of developing better tools to reproduce and to predict the behaviour of these, inherently
complex, systems. Such models overcome the simplifying, but sometimes inaccurate, as-
sumption that the diversity in a society can be reduced assuming the presence of a repre-
sentative agent. In this context, it is important to model parsimoniously the features of
the agents and the local interaction rules, avoiding unnecessary complications. However, to
obtain a global understanding of the problem studied, it is necessary to aggregate a large
number of agents and interactions and to observe the consequent emerging properties at a
macro level. The operation is sometimes challenging, indeed, here the total is rarely simply
the sum of its parts and small changes in the micro-setup can have extended influences on
the macro characteristics of the system observed.
In this thesis we put great care in trying to keep the inherent complexity of the systems
we study analytically tractable. Nevertheless, some of the most interesting phenomena can
be only be observed using different methods such as network theory, fractals and numerical
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methods.
The first two chapters of this manuscript share the same methodological approach: they
both answer their research questions analyzing the topological characteristics of networks.
These constructions, where the individuals are represented as nodes and the interactions
between them as edges that connect pairs of nodes, naturally represent localized relation-
ships at the most micro level while providing efficient tools for studying the macro level
in statistical terms. Indeed, while their use is relatively recent in economics, the theory of
graphs and the social network analysis developed across several centuries (the birth of graph
theory is usually attributed to L. Euler with his seminal paper concerning the ”Konigs-
berg bridges problem” of 1736), so the set of analytical and computational tools available
to researchers is quite ample. Network theory is today mainly devoted to construct and
characterize ”complex networks” exhibiting some of the remarkable and universal properties
that are empirically observed when a large group of individuals interact. Among the most
intensely studied features of complex networks are: the small world property, the presence
of weak ties and the scale-free distribution of the node degrees. We hereby briefly introduce
the reader to these concepts, as they are useful to understand our findings.
A network is scale-free when the degrees of its nodes (i.e., the number of connections
for each node) are distributed according to a power-law. This implies that such network is
composed by a limited number of highly connected individuals (hubs) and a large number of
nodes with few connections. Empirical socio-economic networks of this kind are, for example,
those describing the sexual contacts in a group, the scientific collaborations, the international
trade between countries and the financial relationships between banks. All these networks
share the common characteristic of being very resilient to the failure of random nodes, but
highly sensible to targeted attacks that aim at the elimination of the hubs.
In simple terms, a network is defined small-world when it is such that most of the nodes
are not directly neighbors of each other but they can be reached from every other in a
small number of steps. This feature is typical of graphs where the clustering coefficient (the
INTRODUCTION 9
number of triangles) is relatively large and the average distance among nodes relatively small
compared to the one of a comparable network where connections are random. Examples of
small-world networks in the real world have been observed in the field of job research, in the
bilateral trade between countries and in the political discussions among voters.
Weak-ties are empirically observed features of social networks that emerge when the
graph is partitioned in hierarchies of well tied groups of acquaintances weakly connected
with each other. To clarify this definition an example is useful. Typically the strong ties of
an individual are those with his family and his close friends (most these people normally also
know each other), while the weak ties are those with people that our individual sees, and
speak with, only rarely (such as the ex-schoolmates or the ex-coworkers). The concept of
weak ties is strictly related to the one of information diffusion on a network. In his seminal
paper, Granovetter (1983), shows that individuals with weak ties are much more likely to
receive new information than peers with only strong ties. This is typically the case of the
job-market, where it has been observed that news about new vacancies frequently reach
unemployed workers through people outside their own close social neighborhood.
With these definitions in mind, the fundamental questions shared by both chapter one
and two are: how ubiquitous are these characteristics? Can they be reproduced with very
simple network-based models? In two different setups, both of them relatively simple with
respect to the realities that they intend to model, we observe the emergence of some of these
properties. On one side this underlines the universality of these features and, on the other
side, it indicates that they can be successfully captured even with minimalistic models.
Networks are not the only point of contact between the chapters of this thesis. Both
the second and the third chapter address the role of information exchange in large groups of
individuals. While micro-economic theory studies (strategic) interactions between agents, it
is often assumed that everybody share the same information set (or alternatively the same
beliefs). Our approach is different. We start with a group of agents endowed with an infor-
mation set and we allow them to interact, in one-to-one relationships, and to dynamically
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change their future behaviour as a consequence of these interactions. This allows us to study
both the process of formation and the stable states of opinions and expectations.
The last logical connection between the chapters of this thesis is that, in each of the last
three papers, we construct models with microscopic rules and then we study their influence
on the aggregated features of the system. The fundamental question is then: which are
the emerging properties of these systems? The answer we give depends on the aggregation
mechanism used. Specifically, in chapter two the process is completely driven by local (one-
to-one) interactions; in chapter three instead the information is integrated by the agents
partially through a social mechanism and partially via the signals of a centralized market
(prices); finally, in chapter four, we embed heterogeneity among voters preferences in a
model a political economics model, where the aggregation of preferences happens through
elections.
Let us now briefly introduce, one by one, the papers of this manuscript. For each of them
we will explain the setup, we will introduce the reader to those concepts that some could
find complicate, and we will integrate the results of the chapter providing and overview of
related works and extensions that we realized.
In the first chapter1 we introduce a particular class of weighted networks inspired by
fractal sets. We then proceed to analytically study the topological characteristics of such
constructions, finding some surprising similarity between them and the social networks ob-
served empirically.
In order to understand the results of this paper, it is important have an intuition of
the main properties of fractal sets. The term fractal comes from the latin fra¯ctus which
translates as broken or interrupted. It was first introduced by Mandelbrot (1975) to describe
natural objects that are so fractured that it is impossible to accurately describe them with
the shapes of classical geometry. Classical geometrical objects can be classified on the base
1Written with Timoteo Carletti and published on Physica A
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of their dimensionality, which in turn can be defined as the number of distinct parameters
required to univocally identify a point in the set (a line has one dimension since a single
parameter can univocally define a point on that set; a triangle has two dimensions for
analogous reasons). However, it is difficult to apply this definition to fractals, as they would
turn out to have a dimension and to behave like sets with a different one. The Hausdorff
dimension provides an alternative definition of dimensionality that allows us to say how
well a set covers the space in which it is embedded. With this definition it is possible to
characterize fractals as sets whose Hausdorff (fractal) dimension exceeds its topological one.
Specifically, their dimensionality can be computed using the two parameters of a particular
type of contraction mapping called Iterated Function System (IFS): the number of copies
of the original set (that are made each time the IFS is iterated) and the scale of each of
them with respect to the original set. This particular construction mechanism produces
self-similar sets: if we progressively zoom to finer and finer levels of detail we always observe
conformal copies of the whole set.
As we construct weighted networks that share some features of the fractal sets, we name
the outcome Weighted Fractal Networks (WFN). The construction mechanism is simple: we
start from an initial network (seed) and, iteratively applying an IFS, we construct a family of
weighted networks, in which each iteration builds a certain number of copies of the original
network, each scaled of a certain factor. Using an explicitly defined algorithm and the self-
similarity of fractals, we are able to completely characterize the topology of these networks
as a function of the parameters involved in their construction. In this way we prove that
WFNs exhibit the small world property. Moreover we show that the probability distribution
of the node strength follows a power law whose exponent is the fractal dimension of the
underlying fractal, thus proving that WFN are scale-free.
Many of our results are made more simple by the symmetry of our construction algorithm
and by its completely deterministic nature. At the end of this chapter we therefore relax
the first assumption, generalizing the previous results to non-homogeneous scaling factors
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for the different subnetworks (so that our graphs grow more irregularly). We prove that the
same properties hold true in this case and that the homogeneous WFN are a special case of
the non-homogeneous one. Moreover Carletti (2010), further extends our setup (obtaining
similar results) to stochastic constructions, where also the number of copies of the original
network (made at each step of iteration of the construction) is drawn from a distribution.
These two extensions show that fractal-inspired networks always share some characteristics
with the original fractal sets and that the properties studied in this thesis can be reproduced
using very general construction mechanisms.
While this is a theoretical paper, the construction algorithm for the class of networks
we study can be applied to problems interesting for social scientists. This setup is useful to
model the diffusion of information, with losses of flow, in hierarchical social networks. One
interesting example is the structure of political parties in communist countries. There, the
need to control the society and the means of production, requires a government with many
layers (from the central government down to the industry management) each self-similar
to the initial one (e.g., secretary, politburo, central committee and general assembly). It
is well known (see Hayek, 1944) that these political systems deal with extreme problems
of information loss due to the massive bureaucracy. WFN can be of help in analyzing the
extension (the number of levels of command), and thus the degree of control on the society,
that can be sustained.
The second chapter of this thesis 2 examines the dynamical evolution of a social net-
work emerging from a model of opinion exchanges between a closed group of agents. The
network analysis done in this chapter contributes to the studies of continuous opinion dy-
namics models. Many different models have been proposed by this literature with the aim
of uncovering the mechanisms through which people change opinions due to contacts with
others and to understand under which conditions the process of opinion formation leads to
2Written with Duccio Fanelli and Timoteo Carletti, and published on Advances in Complex Systems
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polarization (fragmentation of the opinions in different groups) or to consensus (all agents
share the same opinion) among the agents. The typical setup is one with a group of agents,
each endowed with an opinion (or a preference) on some subject of discussion. These agents
are generally allowed to interact with each other through some local rule, but they cannot
broadcast directly their points of view to all their peers at the same time.
Many of the contributions to this literature assume that agents meet randomly or impose
a fixed network topology over which interactions are then studied. However, in reality,
exchanges of opinions influence people’s chances to remain in contact, thus modifying the
social network. For instance, an exchange between two persons, that discover to have very
different opinions on some subject, can lead to the end of a well established relationship.
On the other hand, two people with no previous interactions with each other, can discover
that they have very similar opinions and thus develop a friendship.
Bagnoli et al. (2007), elaborating on the previous literature, introduces a model in which
the social network of affinities between agents is assumed to evolve, coupled with opinions
exchanges, following a specific set of rules. When two agents interact they may reach a
compromise and, if so, they increase their mutual degree of acquaintance thus strengthening
their reciprocal affinity. The specificity of this model is that it allows the co-evolution of
opinions and social structures (emblematized by the affinity network), thus generating a
genuine adaptive network. Our aim, in chapter two, is to capture some of the properties
of the networks that emerge from this model. More specifically, the key question that we
ask ourself is whether starting from a random group (both in terms of initial opinions and
social ties), this can evolve toward a final state where the social structure shares some of the
features observed in real world social networks.
We numerically find that, under some quite general conditions, this minimalistic setup
evolves networks that are characterized by the presence of weak ties and in which the net-
work topology is small-world. Moreover, we are able to obtain analytically a very good
approximation of the time evolution of the average degree in the network. The emergence
INTRODUCTION 14
of these properties in our model is a direct consequence of the co-evolution of opinions and
affinities (which evolve self-consistently in a two dimensional space). Indeed, repeating the
same experiments on other models of opinion dynamics on non-trivial fixed network topolo-
gies (which evolve on a one-dimensional space), these characteristics disappear. Our results
underline the fact that, departing from unidimensional models, it is possible to capture
some of the properties of real social networks even with very simple scenarios and without
imposing many restrictive assumptions a priory.
The paper presented in this thesis is the result of a wider endeavor, on our side, to
uncover the properties of these kind of models. Indeed in Righi and Carletti (2009a, 2009b)
we extend the analysis initializing the social network to non trivial topologies. The aim
is to understand if the initial structural properties of the social network are preserved by
the dynamic evolution. We show that, imposing a Baraba´si-Albert scale-free initialization
(where the strength of the affinities among agents is distributed as a power-law), the system
progressively - but slowly - loses memory of the initial state and the degree distribution
becomes progressively log-normal. With this initialization it is initially more difficult to
realize successful interactions (those that change opinions) as most of them must involve
at least one hub to succeed. However, using the Watts and Strogatz (1998) algorithm to
construct an initial network of acquaintanceship with the small-world property, we observe
that this initial distribution is partially preserved as the opinions converge. These papers
thus confirm that this model tends to generate and maintain small-world networks.
In Carletti and Righi (2008) we extend Bagnoli et al. (2007) in a different direction. We
allow contemporaneous meetings between more than two agents (i.e., group interactions)
applying a more general dynamic rule of interaction, in which not only the network and the
opinions evolve, but also the size of the groups that interact. In this, more realistic, setup we
study the phase transition between the consensus and the polarization state. We show that
there exists a polarization-consensus phase transition (in the steady state of the system)
that depends only on how open minded are the agents and not on the parameters relative
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to the social network. Moreover, we find that this three-dimensional space allows for more
complex relationships among the agents. The simulated people first interact in affinities,
essentially selecting their friend, and only eventually they begin to modify their opinions.
Finally in Righi and Carletti (2012), we make one last step forward. Using real world
data on the lengths of social interactions among a group of scientists (from Cattuto, 2010)
participating to a conference, we show evidence that the observed supra linear growth of
total discussion time with respect to the agent connectivity is compatible with two different
hypotheses - about the nature of their interaction - based on the group structure. These
can be summarized in two micro-founded models of social interaction. In the first one we
assume discussions among the agents to be performed about a neutral topic (the opinion
exchanges do not influence the discussion times nor the selection of the partner), i.e. the
goal of the discussions is to introduce himself to the partner (networking). In the second
model, we instead assume that agents encounters are aimed to find a compromise among
them and thus that there could be an opinion update, as consequence of their meeting. We
find that when the group exhibits clearly identified well reputed people, then the outcomes of
our model are consistent with the assumption that discussions are engaged mainly to share
time with the most reputed person (networking). On the other hand, when the reputation
hierarchy is not strong, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that discussions are
finalized to opinions exchange.
For future works we envision several directions of research, mainly linked to applications
of this modeling technique to economics. First, the modeling needs to be improved with the
introduction of some degree of rationality in the agents’ behaviour and of a well defined utility
function (while preserving the heterogeneity in the objectives: for instance some people enjoy
diversity of opinions, while some other prefer to deal with peers with similar ideas). This
kind of implementation could then be used to study economic problems, prominently within
models of asset pricing (see chapter three of this thesis) and political economics. Specifically,
in political economics, the model discussed here could be useful to account for how the social
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interactions among voters influence their political positions.
In the third chapter of the thesis 3, we study the informational efficiency of a financial
market where traders are subject to two types of behavioral bias. It has been long known
that markets can be studied not only for their characteristics in terms of allocative efficiency
(the proportion of profitable exchanges that are actually realized), but also as aggregators of
information. A market is informationally efficient when the price converges, over time, to the
value that would obtain if all market participants had full information about the fundamental
value of the asset exchanged. The study of the informational properties of financial markets
dates back to Hayek (1945) and concentrates on setups where it is assumed that the traders
are all fully rational. Under this assumption it has been shown that both centralized markets,
where an auctioneer centralizes all the trade proposals and there is a unique price (most
of the financial markets belong to this category) and decentralized ones, where buyers and
sellers meet directly and make exchanges so that a plurality of prices can co-exist (goods
markets are frequently of this category), are efficient in aggregating information.
However, financial markets are ultimately composed of human beings whose decisions
can be subject to a variety of behavioral bias. Specifically, there is consistent evidence from
experimental economics and behavioral finance which indicates that traders do not behave
in a fashion consistent with the full rationality assumption. Indeed, traders seem to have
adaptive expectations: they give more importance to past prices than what a fully-rational
agent would (under full rationality past prices cannot serve as predictors for future ones).
Moreover, there is a social dimension in human behaviour that extends to trading. Market
participants do not act on markets solely upon their perceptions or data, they also entertain
discussions with each other that can modify their expectations. On this regard it has been
noted that there exists some degree of confirmatory bias in the behaviour of traders: they
tend to discard the information that differs too much from their priors. In this context
3Written with Gani Aldashev and Timoteo Carletti, and published on Journal of Economic Be-
haviour and Organization
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models of opinion dynamics, similar to the one studied in the second chapter of this thesis,
can be effectively applied to reproduce this kind of behaviour.
The relevant question here is whether the financial markets can still be informationally
efficient when agents do not behave fully rationally. We answer this question with a simple
model, in which traders are initially endowed with some noisy private information (correct on
average) about the fundamental value of an asset and they are subject to the two behavioral
bias discussed. A certain fraction of the agents revises his expectation each period giving
some weight to past prices and also exchanging opinions about future prices with some other
agent. Not all the social information is however integrated by agents, which are subject to
some degree of confirmatory bias. We show that, taken separately, each of the deviations
from rationality worsen the informational efficiency of the market (as expected). However,
when the two bias are combined, the degree of informational efficiency of the market can
be non-monotonic both in the weight of the adaptive component and in the degree of the
confirmatory bias. For some ranges of parameters, we find the unexpected result that the two
biases mutually dampen their effects on price dynamics, thus increasing the informational
efficiency. From the policy perspective, our results contribute to the debate on the nature
of speculative bubbles, suggesting that it is the irrationality of the agents (and not the
incomplete information) to allow the asset prices to deviate - in the long run - from their
fundamental values.
In order to extend and generalized the results of this chapter, in Righi et al. (2011)
we relax some of the technical assumptions made here. We confirm that, with different
mechanisms of entrance of new agents and with different hypotheses on which agents do
update their expectations, most of the results still hold.
The work of this chapter opens the doors for a considerable amount of future research.
First, the model itself should be further generalized in several directions. Indeed, our setup
makes two strong simplifying assumptions: that agents are homogeneous in everything ex-
cept their initial expectations and that the strength of their bias is fixed. The introduction
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of some degree of heterogeneity in the behavioral bias and the possibility for them to evolve
toward rationality would make the model more realistic and able to capture learning effects.
Complementarily, here we study only the interaction between two well known behavioral
bias, but many others are studied in the empirical literature (e.g. loss-aversion, anchoring
and systematic errors). In the future we will try to integrate some of these other deviations
from rationality in our model.
Finally, while our model does not allow for the emergence of speculative bubbles, we
suggest that behavioral bias (that prevent the market from discovering the fundamental
price), could explain their emergence. A current (2012) research proposal of Biondi and
Righi goes in this direction. We propose to study the effects of social interactions in a
context characterized by a realistic modeling of the market micro-structure. Our intuition
is that social interactions (together with behavioral bias) amplify the market oscillations
due to the flux of new information (whose characteristics have been shown to depend on
the accounting rules, imposed by regulators, by Biondi, Giannoccolo, and Galam, 2011),
increasing the chances of appearance of significative deviations of the markets from the
fundamental value of the assets traded. This proposal, encompass both the creation of
an enhanced theoretical model and the realization of, much needed, experimental tests of
the specification presented here. The experimental setup that we envision is one with an
experimental market where the subjects are allowed to trade, to retain informations about
the past prices and in which they are given the opportunity to share information with each
other in a limited fashion. This would allow to study in the laboratory (without the spurious
influence of new exogenous information reaching the traders) the realism of the evolution of
both market prices and expectations.
Finally, in the fourth paper of the thesis4, we deal with an issue that emerges when
studying electoral campaigns: the relationship between campaign spending of candidates
4Which is also our Job Market Paper
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and corruption of the political system. Representative democracy, where policy choices are
delegated to elected representatives, is considered as an efficient mechanism to aggregate
the preferences of large social groups. However, when citizens delegate economic choices to
professional politicians, the latter can use their power (and the imperfect control that the
voters have on their actions) in order to obtain personal advantages (hereby denominated
rents). In the terminology of political economics, this is the problem of the agency costs of
political delegation. This literature - that deals with the conflicts of interest among voters
with different policy preferences and between voters (that would like to be governed by honest
politicians) and candidates - predicts the degrees of efficiency of electoral competitions as
well as the measure to which candidates can obtain personal advantages at the expenses of
voters.
In political economics, the electoral competition is modeled similarly to any other type
of competition with rational players (such as the one between firms). Therefore, when can-
didates are perfectly informed about voters’ preferences, and when voters are rational (i.e.
in perfect competition), the force of the electoral competition is enough to avoid candidates’
misbehavior. However, when voters are ideological or candidates are uncertain about vot-
ers’ evaluation of their platforms (imperfect competition), the competition relaxes and the
candidates can manage to obtain positive rents. Our main contribution is the introduction
of an analysis of candidates’ campaign choices this literature.
We are interested, in particular, in studying countries where corruption is endemic and
where the electoral law limits the possibility for lobbies to bias the political outcome with
their donations to candidates. Our key questions are therefore: How are the levels of corrup-
tion and embezzlement of a political system influenced by electoral campaigns? How rent
extraction can be reduced with anti-corruption policies? We answer these questions in the
context of a probabilistic voting model characterized by the presence of ideological voters
whose preferences can be manipulated, by political candidates, through campaign spend-
ing. Moreover, we assume the existence of a direct link between campaign expenditures and
INTRODUCTION 20
utility of voters. With our modeling choice we are able to capture two opposite empirical
observations. On one side, voters participate to political activities (e.g., political rallies)
even without the perspective of obtaining a direct monetary advantage from this. On the
other side, in advanced democracies the large availability of information about candidates
seems to be connected with a progressive hostility of the population towards politics.
Our main finding and testable prediction is that campaigning choices are orthogonal to
decisions about rent extractions (one does not influence the other directly). Moreover, when
given the opportunity, candidates always invest a significative amount of their resources in
advertisements, in the attempt of being elected. However, the measure in which they do so is
directly correlated with the amount of (dis-)utility obtained by the voters as a consequence
of their campaigns.
In most of the cases positive net rents (i.e. gross rents minus campaign expenditures)
are still possible in equilibrium. We therefore turn our attention to the study of which wel-
fare policies can reduce the inefficiency of the electoral competition. In absence of lobbies,
reducing the amount of resources that can be invested in electoral campaign by the can-
didates always reduces the welfare of the voters. Therefore the typical mechanism studied
by researchers through which the voters’ welfare can be increased is ineffective here. Our
main policy suggestion is to introduce an anti-corruption policy, i.e. a policy that reduces
the ability of candidates to extract rents by abating the incentives to rent accumulation.
In practice, we propose to introduce a new tax on voters that, beyond the control of the
politicians, finances the strengthening of the police, the justice system and the other institu-
tions of control on the political system, so to make more difficult (costly) for the candidate
to embezzle. We show that the introduction of such tax can make the citizens better off.
Surprisingly, it may also make the candidates better off if the policy is not sufficiently ef-
ficient (i.e. when it is insufficiently financed). Finally, we establish the conditions under
which a policy of this kind can achieve the popular support required for an effective im-
plementation and we show that these conditions are difficult to achieve in countries with
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large income inequalities. This results allow us to give a theoretical explanation to the ob-
servation that, while most of the counties where corruption is endemic have policies to fight
the phenomenon, these are usually ineffective. The politicians use the cost of these policies,
and the consequent unwillingness of part of the population to pay for them, as an excuse
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1.1 Introduction
Complex networks have recently attracted a growing interest of scientists from different fields
of research, mainly because they define a powerful framework, among others developed in
the complex systems sciences, for describing, analyzing and modeling real systems that can
be found in Nature and/or society. This framework allows to conjugate the micro to the
macro abstraction levels: nodes can be endowed with local dynamical rules, while the whole
network can be thought to be composed by hierarchies of clusters of nodes, that thus exhibits
aggregated behavior.
The birth of graph theory is usually attributed to L. Euler with his seminal paper con-
cerning the “Ko¨nigsberg bridge problem”(1736), but it is only in the 50’s that network the-
ory started to develop autonomously with the pioneering works of Erdo˝s and Re´nyi (1959).
Nowadays network theory defines a research field in its own (see Albert and Baraba´si, 2002
and Boccaletti et al., 2006) and the scientific activity is mainly devoted to construct and
characterize complex networks exhibiting some of the remarkable properties of real net-
works, scale–free (see Baraba´si and Albert, 1999), small–world (see Watts and Strogatz,
1998) , communities (Fortunato, 2009) weighted links (for instance Yook et al., 2001; Barrat
et al., 2004 and Barrat, Bartelemy and Vespignani, 2004), just to mention few of them.
In recent years we observed an increasing production of papers (for instance, Barabasi et
al., 2001; Jung et al., 2002; Dorogovtsev et al., 2002; Ravasz and Baraba´si, 2003; Dorogovtsev
et al., 2004; Barrat et al., 2004; Zhang, 2008; Zhang, Zhou et al., 2008 and Guan et al.,
2009) where authors proposed a new point of view by constructing networks exhibiting
scale-free and hierarchical structures by adapting ideas taken from fractal construction, e.g.
Koch curve or Sierpinski gasket. The aim of the present paper is to generalize these latter
constructions and to define a general framework, hereby named Weighted Fractal Networks,
WFN for short, whose networks share with fractal sets several interesting properties, for
instance the self-similarity and the hierarchical structures.
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The WFN are constructed via an explicit algorithm and we are able to completely an-
alytically characterize their topology as a function of the parameters involved in the con-
struction. We are thus able to prove that WFN exhibit the “small–world”property, i.e. slow
(logarithmic) increase of the average shortest path with the network size, and large average
clustering coefficient. Moreover the probability distribution of node strength follows a power
law whose exponent is the Hausdorff (fractal) dimension of the “underlying”fractal, hence
the WFN are scale–free.
WFN also represent an explicitely computable model for the renormalization procedure
recently applied to complex networks (see Song et al. 2005, 2006; Radicchi et al. 2008,
2009).
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we will introduce the model,
we outline the similarities with fractal sets and the differences with respect to the above
mentioned earlier results. In Section 1.3 we present the analytical characterization of such
networks also supported by dedicated numerical simulations. We then introduce in Sec-
tion 1.4 a straightforward generalization of the previous theory, and thus we conclude by
showing a possible application of WFN to the study of fractal structures emerging in Nature.
1.2 The model
According to Mandelbrot (1982) “a fractal is by definition a set for which the Hausdorff
dimension strictly exceeds the topological dimension”. One of the most amazing and in-
teresting feature of fractals is their self-similarity, namely looking at all scales we can find
conformal copies of the whole set. Starting from this property one can provide rules to build
up fractals as fixed point of Iterated Function Systems (see for details, Barnsley, 1988 and
Edgar, 1990), IFS for short, whose Hausdorff dimension is completely characterized by two
main parameters, the number of copies s > 1 and the scaling factor 0 < f < 1 of the IFS. Let
us observe that in this case this dimension coincides with the so called similarity dimension
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Figure 1.1: The definition of the map Ts,f,a. On the left a generic initial graph G with
its attaching node a (red on-line) and a generic weighted edge w ∈ G (blue on-line). On
the right the new graph G′ obtained as follows: Let G(1), . . . , G(s) be s copies of G, whose
weighted edges (blue on-line) have been scaled by a factor f . For i = 1, . . . , s let us denote
by a(i) the node in G(i) image of the labeled node a ∈ G, then link all those labeled nodes
to a new node a′ (red on-line) through edges of unitary weight. The connected network
obtained linking the s copies G(i) to the node a′ will be by definition the image of G through
the map: G′ = Ts,f,a(G).
(Edgar, 1990), dfract = − log s/ log f .
The main goal of this paper is to generalize such ideas to networks, aimed at constructing
weighted complex networks 1 with some a priori prescribed topology, that will be described in
terms of node strength distribution, average (weighted) shortest path and average (weighted)
clustering coefficient, depending on the two main parameters: the number of copies and the
scaling factor 2. Moreover taking advantage of the similarity with the IFS fractals, some
topological properties of the networks will depend on the fractal dimension of the IFS fractal.
Let us fix a positive real number f < 1 and a positive integer s > 1 and let us consider a
(possibly) weighted networkG composed byN nodes, one of which has been labeled attaching
node and denoted by a. We then define a map, Ts,f,a, depending on the two parameters s,
f and on the labeled node a, whose action on networks is described in Fig. 1.1.
1We hereby present the construction for undirected networks, but it can be straightforwardly generalized
to directed graphs as well.
2A straightforward generalization will be presented in the next Section 1.4. See also Carletti (2009) where
the WFN theory will be generalized as to include a stochastic iteration process.
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So starting with a given initial networkG0 we can construct a family of weighted networks
(Gk)k≥0 iteratively applying the previously defined map: Gk := Ts,f,a(Gk−1).
Because of its general definition, the map Ts,f,a could be used to cast the various models
of fractal or hierarchical networks recently proposed (Barabasi et al., 2001; Jung et al., 2002;
Dorogovtsev et al., 2002; Ravasz and Baraba´si, 2003; Dorogovtsev et al., 2004; Barrat et al.,
2004; Zhang, 2008; Zhang, Zhou et al., 2008 and Guan et al., 2009) into a unified scheme, in-
stead of using “ad hoc”constructions and computations, and so to obtain informations about
some relevant topological quantities, such as average shortest path and nodes strength, in a
straightforward way using the proposed framework and thus prove, for instance, the small–
world character of WFN. In this framework we are also able to construct scale–free networks
with any desired power–law just by setting s and f , thus overcoming some limitations of
Dorogovtsev et al. (2002).
Let us observe that the main differences between WFN and the above mentioned models
reside in the tree–like structure, instead of a star–like (such as those of Baraba´si et al., 2001;
Jung et al., 2002; and Ravasz and Baraba´si, 2003), that the former acquire because of the
growth process, although WFN will exhibit high clustering coefficient, and the absence of a
preferential attachment mechanism weight dependent (such as those of Yook, 2001; Barrat
et al., 2004 and Dorogovtsev and Mendes, 2004).
For the sake of completeness we present numerical results for two WFN: the Sierpinski
one (see Fig. 1.2) and the Cantor dust (see Fig. 1.3).
Given G0 and the map Ts,f,a we are able to completely characterize the topology of each
Gk and also of the limit networkG∞, defined as the fixed point of the map: G∞ = Ts,f,a(G∞).
Let us observe that the topology of G∞ will not depend on the initial “seed”G0 as it happens
for the IFS fractal sets.
Thus the WFN undergo through a growth process strictly related to the inverse of the
renormalization procedure (see Song et al. 2005, 2006); at the same timeG∞ will be infinitely
renormalizable.
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Figure 1.2: The “Sierpinski” WFN, s = 3, f = 1/2 and G0 is composed by a single
node. From the left to the right G1, G2, G3 and G4. Gray scale (color on-line) reproduces
edges weights: the darker the color the larger the weight. The dimension of the fractal is
log 3/ log 2 ∼ 1.5850. Visualization was done using Himmeli software [38] .
Figure 1.3: The “Cantor dust” WFN, s = 4, f = 1/5 and G0 is a triangle. From the left
to the right G0, G1, G2 and G3. Gray scale (color on-line) reproduces edges weights: the
darker the color the larger the weight. The dimension of the fractal is log 4/ log 5 ∼ 0.8614.
Visualization was done using Himmeli software [38].
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1.3 Results
The aim of this section is to characterize the topology of the graphs Gk for all k ≥ 1 and
G∞, by analytically studying their properties such as the average degree, the node strength
distribution, the average (weighted) shortest path and the average (weighted) clustering
coefficient.




k − 1)/(s− 1) , (1.1)
being N0 the number of nodes in the initial graph, while the number of edges satisfies
Ek = s
kE0 + s(s
k − 1)/(s− 1) , (1.2)
being E0 the number of edges in the graph G0. Hence in the limit of large k the average






1 + (s− 1)N0 . (1.3)
Let us denote the weighted degree of node i ∈ Gk, also called node strength (see Barrat






ij , being w
(k)
ij the weight of the edge (ij) ∈ Gk; then using the





and, provided sf 6= 1, easily show that
Wk = 2s
(sf)k − 1
sf − 1 + (sf)
kW0 .




3Let us observe that the same is true if sf = 1; in this case, in fact Wk grows linearly with k, thus slower
than Nk.
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Node strength distribution.
Let gk(x) denote the number of nodes in Gk that have strength ω
(k)
i = x and let us assume
g0 to have values in some finite discrete subset of the positive reals, namely:
g0(x) > 0 if and only if x ∈ {x1, . . . , xm} ,
otherwise g0(x) = 0. Using the property of the map Ts,f,a we straightforwardly get gk(x) =
sgk−1(x/f) provided 4 x 6= s and x 6= fs+ 1, from which we can conclude that for all k:
gk(x) = s
kg0(x/f
k) , gk(fs+ 1) = s and gk(s) = 1 . (1.4)
This implies than the node strengths are distributed according to a power law with exponent
dfract = − log s/ log f , that equals the fractal dimension of the fractal obtained as fixed point
of the IFS with the same parameters s and f . In fact defining xik = f
kxi we get:




log xik + log g0(xi)− log s
log f
log xi ,
namely for large k (see Fig. 1.4)
gk(x) ∼ C/xdfrac . (1.5)
Average weighted shortest path.












4 Without loose of generality we can assume that for all integers i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and k > 0 we have
fkxj 6= xi and fk(fxj + 1) 6= xi.
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Figure 1.4: Node Strengths Distribution. Plot of the renormalized node strengths distribu-
tion D−1 log10 gk(x), where D = dfrac in the homogeneous case, while D = − s log slog(f1...fs) in
the non–homogeneous one. Symbols refer to : 2 the finite approximation G14 with 2391484
nodes of the “Sierpinski” WFN, s = 3, f = 1/2 and G0 is formed by one initial node; © the
finite approximation G11 composed by 3495253 nodes of the “Cantor dust” WFN, s = 4,
f = 1/5 and G0 is made by a triangle; 4 the finite approximation G11 composed by 3495253
nodes of the non–homogeneous “Cantor dust” WFN, s = 4, f1 = 1/2, f2 = 1/3, f3 = 1/5,
f4 = 1/7 and G0 is formed by a triangle. The reference line has slope −1; linear best fits
(data not shown) provide a slope −0.9964±0.034 with R2 = 0.9993 for the Sierpinski WFN,
a slope −1.002±0.064 with R2 = 0.9996 for the Cantor dust WFN and a slope −1.006±0.024
with R2 = 0.9976 for the non–homogeneous Cantor dust WFN.
being p
(k)
ij the weighted shortest path linking nodes i and j in Gk.








i.e. the sum of all weighted shortest paths ending at the attaching node, ak ∈ Gk. One can
prove (see Appendix 1.6) that for large k the asymptotic behavior of Λ
(ak)




N0(s− 1) + 1
(1− f)(s− 1)s
k−1 . (1.8)
Using the construction algorithm and its symmetry one can prove (see Appendix 1.6)
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Figure 1.5: The average weighted shortest path. Plot of the renormalized average weighted
shortest path λ˜k versus the iteration number k, where λ˜k = λk
(s−F )(s2−F )
2s2(s−1) and F = f1 +· · ·+
fs for the non–homogeneous case, while F = sf for the homogeneous one. Symbols refer
to: 2 the “Sierpinski” WFN, s = 3, f = 1/2 and G0 is formed by one initial node; © the
“Cantor dust” WFN, s = 4, f = 1/5 and G0 is made by a triangle; 4 the non–homogeneous
“Cantor dust” WFN, s = 4, f1 = 1/2, f2 = 1/3, f3 = 1/5, f4 = 1/7 and G0 is formed by a
triangle.
that Λk satisfies the recursive relation
Λk = sfΛk−1 + 2s[(s− 1)Nk−1 + 1][Nk−1 + fΛ(ak−1)k−1 ] , (1.9)
that provides the following asymptotic behavior in the limit of large k (see Fig. 1.5)
λk =
Λk
Nk(Nk − 1) −→k→∞
2(s− 1)
(1− f)(s− f) . (1.10)
We can also compute the average shortest path, `k, formally obtained by setting f = 1
in the previous formulas (1.6) and (1.7). Hence slightly modifying the results previously













where the last relation has been obtained using the growth law of Nk given by equation (1.1)
(see Fig. 1.6). Let us remark that the average shortest path is a topological quantity and
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Figure 1.6: The average shortest path `k as a function of the network size (semilog graph).
Plot of the renormalized average shortest path ˜`k versus the network size Nk, where ˜`k =
`k
log s
2 . Symbols refer to : 2 the “Sierpinski” WFN, s = 3, f = 1/2 and G0 is formed by one
initial node; © the “Cantor dust” WFN, s = 4, f = 1/5 and G0 is made by a triangle. The
reference line has slope 1. Linear best fits (data not shown) provides a slope 0.9942± 0.019
and R2 = 1 for the Sierpinski WFN and a slope 0.9952 ± 0.019 and R2 = 1 for the Cantor
dust WFN.
thus it doesn’t depend on the scaling factor, that’s why we don’t report in Fig. 1.6 the case
of the non-homogeneous WFN.
Thus, as previously stated, the network grows unbounded but with the logarithm of the
network size, while the weighted shortest distances stay bounded.
Average clustering coefficient.
The average clustering coefficient (Watts and Strogatz, 1998 and Boccaletti et al. 2006) of
the graph Gk is defined as the average over the whole set of nodes of the local clustering
coefficient c
(k)




i . Because of the construction
algorithm the network inherits a tree–like structure preventing the inner core from acquiring
new triangles, in such a way that the number of possible triangles, hence the local clustering
coefficient, at each step increases just by a factor s. Thus after k iterations we will have
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Ck = s
kC0, being C0 the sum of local clustering coefficients in the initial graph. We can





< c0 > N0
(s− 1)N0 + 1 . (1.12)
On the other hand, one can use edges’ values to weigh the clustering coefficient (Sarama¨ki
et al. 2007); hence generalizing the previous relation, we can easily prove that the average
weighted clustering coefficient of the graph is asymptotically given by:




< γ0 > N0








where once again, the fractal dimension dfract of the IFS fractal play a relevant role.
1.4 Non–homogeneous Weighted Fractal Networks
The aim of this section is to slightly generalize the previous construction to the case of
non–homogeneous scaling factors for each subnetwork G(i). So given an integer s > 1 and
s real numbers f1, . . . , fs ∈ (0, 1), we modify the map Ts,f,a by allowing a different scaling
for each edge weight according to which subgraph it belongs to: if the edge w(j), image of
w ∈ G, belongs to G(j), then w(j) = fjw.
Let us remark that the construction presented in the former Section 1.2 is a particular
case of the latter, once we take f1 = · · · = fs = f ; we nevertheless decided for a sake
of clarity, to present it before, because the computations involved in this latter general
construction could have hidden the simplicity of the underlying idea. We hereby present
some results for the non–homogeneous “Cantor dust”WFN (see Fig. 1.7).
Using the recursiveness of the algorithm we can, once again, completely characterize the
topology of the non-homogeneous WFN, moreover only the weighted quantities will vary
with respect to the homogeneous case. For instance, a straightforward, but cumbersome,
generalization of the computations presented in the previous Sections allows us to prove that
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Figure 1.7: The non–homogeneous “Cantor dust” WFN, s = 4, f1 = 1/2, f2 = 1/3,
f3 = 1/5, f4 = 1/7 and G0 is formed by a triangle. From the left to the right G0, G1, G2
and G3. Gray scale (color on-line) reproduces edges weights: the darker the color the larger
the weight. Visualization was done using Himmeli software [38].




(s− F )(s2 − F ) , (1.14)
where F = f1 + · · · + fs. Let us observe that Eq. (1.14) reduces to Eq. (1.10) once we set
f1 = · · · = fs = f and thus F = sf .
Let g0(x) denote the number of nodes with node strength equal to x in the initial network
G0; then after k steps of the algorithm, all nodes strengths will be rescaled by a factor
fk11 . . . f
ks
s , where the non-negative integers ki do satisfy k1 + · · ·+ ks = k. Because this can
be done in k!/(k1! . . . ks!) possible different ways, we get the following relation for the node
strength distribution for the network Gk:
gk(f
k1




k1! . . . ks!
g0(x) with k1 + · · ·+ ks = k . (1.15)
After sufficiently many steps and assuming that the main contribution arises from the choice
k1 ∼ · · · ∼ ks ∼ k/s, we can use Stirling formula to get the approximate distribution (see
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Fig. 1.4)
log gk(x) ∼ s log s
log(f1 . . . fs)
log x , (1.16)
so once again the nodes strength distribution follows a power law.
1.5 Conclusions
In this paper we introduced a unifying framework for complex networks sharing several
properties with fractal sets, hereby named Weighted Fractal Networks. This theory, that
generalizes to graphs the construction of IFS fractals, allows us to build complex networks
with a prescribed topology, whose main quantities can be analytically predicted and have
been shown to depend on the fractal dimension of the IFS fractal; for instance the networks
are scale–free with exponent the fractal dimension. Moreover the weighted fractal networks
share with IFS fractals, the self-similarity structure, and are explicitly computable examples
of renormalizable complex networks.
These networks exhibit the small–world property. In fact the average shortest path
increases logarithmically with the system size (1.11), hence it is small as the average shortest
path of a random network with the same number of nodes and same average degree. On the
other hand the clustering coefficient is asymptotically constant (1.12), thus larger than the
clustering coefficient of a random network that shrinks to zero as the system size increases.
The self-similarity property of the weighted fractal networks makes them suitable to
model real problems involving generic diffusion over the network coupled with local looses
of flow, here modeled via the parameter f < 1. For instance electrical grids in the case of
mankind artifacts, metabolic networks of living organisms (West et al., 1997; Banavar et
al., 1999) or air flows in mammalian lungs (Suki et al., 1994; Baraba´si et al., 1996; Kitaoka
and Suki, 1997; Andrade et al., 1998; Kamiya et al., 2007; and Almeida et al. 1999) in the
case of natural networks. In all these studies, assuming some hierarchical fractal structure,
scientists could explain some natural laws, such as the allometric scaling or the avalanches
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in the mammalian respiratory system, although the actual branching numbers could not be
explained. Using our framework we suggest a possible analysis for these values; for instance
in mammalian lungs where air flows through bronchi–bronchioles, submitted to air vessels’
section reduction. Assuming that the recorded avalanches and power–laws, hence the fractal
structure, have some functional–biological reason, e.g. a typical time needed to fulfill alveoli
with oxygenated air from the primary bronchi, we can relate this time to the average shortest
weighted path, which in turn depends of the number of copies s and the scaling factor f .
In other words the topology of such networks could have been shaped by evolution in such
a way any two nodes can be connected in a finite optimal time, whatever their physical
distance is.
Let us finally observe that in this case the fragility of the network with respect to failure
of the edges, see Moreira (2009) and references therein, is a main biological question, that
can be restated as follows: how many air vessels should fail before the lung stops to correctly
operate ?











, i.e. the sum
of all weighted shortest paths to ak. Then using the recursive property and the symmetry





k−1 + sNk−1 ,
where Nk−1 is the number of nodes in Gk−1. This recursion can be easily solved to get for












sf − 1 , (1.17)
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from which we can conclude, because f < 1, that Λ
(ak)
k exhibits the asymptotic behavior
given by equation (1.8).
Computation of Λk
Starting from the definition of the sum of all weighted shortest paths (1.7), the recursive




















where the first contribution takes into account all paths starting from and arriving to nodes
belonging to the same subgraph, that using the symmetry can be chosen to be G
(1)
k . The
second term takes into account all the possible paths where the initial point and the final





k and multiply the contribution by a combinatorial factor s(s− 1). Finally the last
term is the sum of all paths arriving to the attaching node ak; once again the symmetry
allows us to reduce the sum to only one subgraph, say G
(1)
k , and multiply the contribution
by 2s.
Using the scaling mechanism for the edges, the first term in the right hand side of





ij = fΛk−1 .
By construction, each shortest path connecting two nodes belonging to two different
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where N
(i)
k denotes the number of nodes in the subgraph G
(i)
k . Using the symmetry of the
















The last term of equation (1.18) can be related to Λ
(ak−1)
k−1 by observing that each path
arriving at ak must pass through a
(i)



































k has as many nodes as Gk−1 we can conclude that N
(1)
k = Nk−1 and
finally to rewrite equation (1.18) as:
Λk = sfΛk−1 + 2s[(s− 1)Nk−1 + 1][Nk−1 + fΛ(ak−1)k−1 ] .
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2.1 Introduction
Modeling social phenomena represents a major challenge that has in recent years attracted
a growing interest. Insight into the problem can be gained by resorting, among others, to
the so called Agent Based Models, an approach that is well suited to bridge the gap between
hypotheses concerning the microscopic behavior of individual agents and the emergence of
collective phenomena in a population composed of many interacting heterogeneous entities.
Constructing sound models deputed to return a reasonable approximation of the scru-
tinized dynamics is a delicate operation, given the degree of arbitrariness in assigning the
rules that govern mutual interactions. In the vast majority of cases, data are scarce and
do not sufficiently constrain the model, hence the provided answers can be questionable.
Despite this intrinsic limitation, it is however important to inspect the emerging dynamical
properties of abstract models, formulated so to incorporate the main distinctive traits of a
social interaction scheme. In this paper we aim at discussing one of such models, by com-
bining analytical and numerical techniques. In particular, we will focus on characterizing
the evolution of the underlying social network in terms of dynamical indicators.
It is nowadays well accepted that several social groups display two main features: the
small world property (Watts and Strogatz, 1998) and the presence of weak ties (Granovetter,
1983). The first property implies that the network exhibits clear tendency to organize in
densely connected clusters. As an example, the probability that two friends of mine are
also, and independently, friends to each other is large. Moreover, the shortest path between
two generic individuals is small as compared to the analogous distance computed for a
random network made of the same number of individuals and inter-links connections. This
observation signals the existence of short cuts in the social tissue. The second property is
related to the cohesion of the group which is mediated by small groups of well tied elements,
that are conversely weakly connected to other groups. The skeleton of a social community
is hence a hierarchy of subgroups.
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A natural question arise on the ubiquity of the aforementioned peculiar aspects, distinc-
tive traits of a real social networks: can they eventually emerge, starting from a finite group
of initially randomly connected actors? We here provide an answer to this question in the
framework of a minimalistic opinion dynamics model, which exploit an underlying substrate
where opinions can flow. More specifically, the network that defines the topological structure
is imagined to evolve, coupled to the opinions and following a specific set of rules: once two
agents reach a compromise and share a common opinion, they also increase their mutual
degree of acquaintance, so strengthening the reciprocal link. In this respect, the model that
we are shortly going to introduce hypothesize a co-evolution of opinions and social structure,
in the spirit of a genuine adaptive network (Gross and Blasius, 2008 and Zimmermann et
al., 2004).
Working within this framework, we will show that an initially generated random group,
with respect to both opinion and social ties, can evolve towards a final state where small
worlds and weak ties effects are indeed present. The results of this paper constitute the
natural follow up of a series of papers (Bagnoli et al., 2007; Carletti et al., 2008a, 2008b),
where the time evolution of the opinions and affinity, together with the fragmentation vs.
polarization phenomena, have been discussed.
Different continuous opinion dynamics models have been presented in literature, see for
instance Deffuant et al. (2000), Galam (2008) and Castellano et al. (2009), dealing with the
general consensus problem. The aim is to shed light onto the assumptions that can eventually
yield to fixation, a final mono-clustered configuration where all agents share the same belief,
starting from an initial condition where the inspected population is instead fragmented into
several groups. In doing so, and in most cases, a fixed network of interactions is a priori
imposed (as in Amblard and Deffuant, 2004), and the polarization dynamics studied under
the constraint of the imposed topology. At variance, and as previously remarked, we will
instead allow the underlying network to dynamically adjust in time, so modifying its initially
imposed characteristics. Let us start by revisiting the main ingredients of the model. A more
CHAPTER 2. ENDOGENOUS SOCIAL NETWORKS AND OPINION EXCHANGE 42
detailed account can be found in Bagnoli et al. (2007).
Consider a closed group of N agents, each one possessing its own opinion on a given
subject. We here represent the opinion of element i as a continuous real variable Oi ∈ [0, 1].
Each agent is also characterized by its affinity score with respect to the remaining N − 1
agents, namely a vector αij , whose entries are real number defined in the interval [0, 1]: the
larger the value of the affinity αij , the more reliable the relation of i with the end node j.
Both opinion and affinity evolve in time because of binary encounters between agents. It
is likely that more interactions can potentially occur among individuals that are more affine,
as defined by the preceding indicator, or that share a close opinion on a debated subject.
Mathematically, these requirements can be accommodated for by favoring the encounters
between agents that minimizes a social metric , as defined below. More concretely, select
at random, with uniform probability, the agent i and quantify its social distance with the
other members of the community: this is the N − 1 vector dij = |∆Otij |(1 − αtij), where
∆Otij = O
t
i −Otj is the opinions’ difference of agents i and j at time t. The smaller the value
of dtij the closer the agent j to i, both in term of affinity and opinion. Mutual affinity can in
fact mitigate the difference in opinion, thus determining the degree of social similarity of two
individuals, an observation that inspires the proposed definition of dtij . A Gaussian random
perturbation Nj(0, σ) (mean zero and variance σ) is added to dtij so to mimic the impact
of a social mixing effect, the obtained vector Dtij = d
t
ij + Nj(0, σ) being the social metric.
The second agent j for the paired interaction is the one closer to i with respect to Dtij .
For a more detailed analysis on the interpretation of σ as a social temperature responsible
of a increased mixing ability of the population, we refer to Bagnoli et al. (2007), Carletti
et al. 2008a, 2008b). Let us observe that other models, see for instance Schweitzer and
Ho lys (2000), Bordogna and Albano (2007) and Klimek et al. (2008), make use of the social
temperature concept: beyond the specificity of each the formulation, the social temperature
is always invoked to control the degree of mixing in the population.
Once two agents are selected for interaction they possibly update their opinions (if they
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tanh(β1(x− αc)) + 1
2
and Γ2 (x) = − tanh(β2(|x| −∆Oc)) , (2.2)
two activating functions which formally reduce to step functions for large enough values of
the parameters β1 and β2, as it is the case in the numerical simulations reported below.
Let us briefly comment on the mathematical construction of the model. Suppose two
subjects meet and imagine they challenge their respective opinions, assumed to be divergent,
i.e. |∆Oij | ' 1. According to the bounded confidence assumption, see for instance Deffuant
et al. (2000), when the disagreement falls beyond a given threshold, the agents stick to
their positions. As opposed to this simplistic view, in the present case, and as follows a
punctual interaction, the agents can still modify each other beliefs, provided the mutual
affinity αtij is larger than the reference value αc. This scenario accounts for a plausible
strategy that individual can adopt when processing a contradictory information: if αtij < αc,
the agent ignores the dissonating input, which is therefore not assimilated; Conversely, when
the opinion comes from a trustable source (αtij > αc) the agent is naturally inclined to
restore the consistency among the cognitions, and thus adjust its belief. The scalar quantity
αij schematically accounts for a large number of hidden variables (personality, attitudes,
behaviors,..), all here integrated in the abstract affinity concept. Similarly each affinity
entry evolves in a self-consistent fashion, as guided by the individual dynamics. When
two subjects gather together and discover to share common interests, |∆Otij | < ∆Oc, they
increase their mutual affinity score, αtij → 1. The opposite (αtij → 0) holds if |∆Otij | > ∆Oc.
The logistic contribution in Eqs. (2.1) confines αtij in the interval [0, 1], while it maximizes
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the change in affinity for pairs with αtij ' 0.5. Pairs of individuals with αtij ' 1 (resp. 0)
have already formed their mind and so can expected to behave more conservatively.
Despite its simplicity the model exhibits an highly non linear dependence on the involved
parameters, αc, ∆Oc and σ, with a phase transition between a polarized and fragmented
dynamics (Bagnoli et al., 2007).
A typical run for N = 100 agents is reported in the main panel of Fig. 2.1, for a choice of
the parameters which yields to a consensus state. The insets represent three successive time
snapshots of the underlying social network: The N nodes are the individuals, while the links
are assigned based on the associated values of the affinity. The figures respectively refer to
a relatively early stage of the evolution t = 1000, to an intermediate time t = 5000 and to
the convergence time Tc = 10763. Time is here calculated as the number of iterations (not
normalized with respect to N). The corresponding three networks can be characterized using
standard topological indicators 1. (see Table 2.1), e.g. the mean degree 〈k〉, the network
clustering coefficient C and the average shortest path 〈`〉. An explicit definition of those
quantities will be given below.
In the forthcoming discussion we will focus on the evolution of the network topology,
limited to a choice of the parameters that yield to a final mono cluster.
〈k〉(t) C(t) 〈`〉(t)
t = 1000 0.073 0.120 3.292
t = 5000 0.244 0.337 2.013
t = Tc 0.772 0.594 1.228
Table 2.1: Topological indicators of the social networks presented in Fig. 2.1. The mean
degree 〈k〉, the network clustering C and the average shortest path 〈`〉 are reported for the
three time configurations depicted in the figure.
Before proceeding further let us anticipate the main results of this paper so to mark the
differences with previous analysis. On the one hand, we will provide an analytical solution
for the dynamical evolution of the average network properties (mean and variance). In
1See Albert and Baraba´si (2002) and Boccaletti et al. (2006)
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Figure 2.1: Opinions as function of time. The run refers to αc = 0.5, ∆Oc = 0.5 and
σ = 0.01. The underlying network is displayed at different times, testifying on its natural
tendency to evolve towards a single cluster of affine individuals. Initial opinions are uniformly
distributed in the interval [0, 1], while α0ij are randomly assigned in [0, 1/2] with uniform
distribution.
this respect we shall clearly expand over previous investigation (see Carletti et al., 2008)
where a closure for the equations of the moments was imposed by neglecting the variance
contribution. On the other hand, we will characterize in depth the network properties by
computing and monitoring numerically a large set of topological indicators.
2.2 The social network
The affinity matrix drives the interaction via the selection mechanism. It hence can be
interpreted as the adjacency matrix of the underlying social network, i.e. the network of
social ties that influences the exchange of opinions between acquaintances, as mediated by
the encounters. Because the affinity is a dynamical variable of the model, we are actually
focusing on an adaptive social network (Gross and Blasius, 2008; Zimmermann et al., 2004)
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: The network topology influences in turn the dynamics of opinions, this latter providing a
feedback on the network itself and so modifying its topology. In other words, the evolution
of the topology is inherent to the dynamics of the model because of the proposed self-
consistent formulation and not imposed as an additional stochastic ingredient, as e.g. rewire
and/or add/remove links according to a given probability (see Holme and Newman, 2006
and Kozma and Barrat, 2008) once the state variables have been updated. It is the inherent
dynamics of the system (which includes the noise source that we accommodated for) which
governs the network evolution, the links being not assigned on the basis of a pure stochastic
mechanisms. Moreover, in our model, at a given time t all possible pairs have a finite chance
of interaction, as opposed to Holme and Newman (2006) and Kozma and Barrat (2008),
where the interaction is instead dictated by the existing links.
Remark 1 (Weighted network). Let us observe that the affinity assumes positive real values,
hence we can consider a weighted social networks, where agents weigh the relationships.
Alternatively, one can introduce a cut-off parameter, αf : agents i and j are socially linked
if and only if the recorded relative affinity is large enough, meaning αij > αf . Roughly, the
agent chooses its closest friends among all his neighbors.
The first approach avoids the introduction of non–smooth functions and it is suitable to
carry on the analytical calculations. The latter results more straightforward for numerical
oriented applications.
As anticipated, we are thus interested in analyzing the model, for a specific choice of the
parameters, αc, σ and ∆Oc, yielding to consensus, and studying the evolution of the net-
work topology, here analyzed via standard network indicators: the average value of weighted
degree, the cluster coefficient and the averaged shortest path. These quantities will be quan-
tified for (i) a fixed population, monitoring their time dependence; (ii) as a function of the
population size, photographing the dynamics at convergence, namely when consensus has
been reached.
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Time evolution of weighted degree
The simplest and the most intensively studied one–vertex (i.e. local) characteristic is the
node degree 2: the total number of its connections or its nearest neighbors. Because we are
dealing with a weighted network we can also introduce the normalized weighted node degree,




ij/(N − 1). Its mean






Let us observe that the normalization factor N − 1 holds for a population of N agents, self-
interaction being disregarded, 〈s〉 belongs hence to the interval [0, 1] and having eliminated
the relic of the population size, one can properly compare quantities calculated for networks
made of different number of agents.
All these quantities evolve in time because of the dynamics of the opinions and/or affini-










Let us observe that the evolution of affinity and opinion can be decoupled when ∆Oc = 1.
For ∆Oc < 1, this is not formally true. However on can argue for an approximated strategy
(as in Carletti et al., 2008), by replacing the step function Γ2 by its time average counterpart
γ2, where the dependence in ∆O
t







αtij(1− αtij) = γ2(〈s〉 − 〈s2〉) , (2.5)
where 〈s2〉 = ∑α2ij/(N(N − 1)). Let us observe that γ2 is of the order of 1/N2 times, a
factor taking care of the asynchronous dynamics (see Carletti et al., 2008).
2Let us observe that the affinity may not be symmetric and thus the inspected social network will be
directed. One has thus to distinguish between In–degree, kin, being the number of incoming edges of a vertex
and Out–degree, kout, being the number of its outgoing edges. In the following we will be interested only in
the outgoing degree, from here on simply referred to as to degree.
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In Carletti and Fanelli (2008) authors proved that (2.5) can be analytically solved once we
provide the initial distribution of node strengths (see 2.4 for a short discussion of the involved
methods). Assuming si(0) to be uniformly distributed in [0, 1/2], we get the following exact
solution (see Fig. 2.2):
〈s〉(t) = e
γ2t
eγ2t − 1 −
2eγ2t






Using similar ideas we can prove (see Carletti and Fanelli, 2008) that the variance σ2s(t) =
〈s2〉 − 〈s〉2 is analytically given by
σ2(t) =
2e2γ2t
























Figure 2.2: Evolution of 〈s〉(t). Dashed line (blue on-line) refers to numerical simulations
with parameters αc = 0.5, ∆Oc = 0.5 and σ = 0.3. The full line (black on-line) is the
analytical solution (2.6) with a best fitted parameter γ2 = 1.6 10
−4. The dot denotes the
convergence time in the opinion space to the consensus state, for the used parameters affini-
ties did not yet converge. Let us observe in fact that affinities and opinions do converge on
different time scale (see Carletti et al, 2008).
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The comparison between analytical and numerical profiles is enclosed in Fig. 2.2, where
the evolution of 〈s〉(t) is traced. Let us observe that here γ2 will serve as a fitting parame-
ter, when testing the adequacy of the proposed analytical curves versus direct simulations,
instead of using its computed numerical value (see Carletti et al, 2008). The qualitative
correspondence is rather satisfying, in accordance with the analytical results.
Assume Tc to label the time needed for the consensus in opinion space to be reached.
Clearly, Tc depends on the size of the simulated system
3. From the above relation (2.6),




eγ2(N)Tc(N) − 1 −
2eγ2(N)Tc(N)











and Tc(N) = O (Na), with a ∈ (1, 2). Hence γ2(N)Tc(N) → 0 when
N → ∞ and thus 〈s〉(Tc(N)) is predicted to be a decreasing function of the population
size N , which converges to the asymptotic value 1/4, the initial average node strength (see
Fig. 2.3), given the selected initial condition. In sociological terms this means that even
when consensus is achieved the larger the group the smaller, on average, the number of local
acquaintances. This is a second conclusion that one can reach on the basis of the above
analytical developments.
Small world
Several social networks exhibit the remarkable property that one can reach an arbitrary far
member of the community, via a relatively small number of intermediate acquaintances. This
holds true irrespectively of the size of the underlying network. Experiments (see Milgram
and Traver, 1969) have been devised to quantify the “degree of separation”in real system,
3In Bagnoli et al. (2007) and Carletti et al. (2006) it was shown that Tc scales faster than linearly but
slower than quadratically with respect to the population size N .
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Figure 2.3: Average node strength at convergence as a function of the population size.
Parameters are ∆Oc = 0.5, σ = 0.5 and four values of αc have been used : (3) αc = 0, (4)
αc = 0.25, (2) αc = 0.5 and (©) αc = 0.75. Vertical bars are standard deviations computed
over 10 replicas of the numerical simulation using the same initial conditions.
and such phenomenon is nowadays termed the “small world”effect, also referred to as the
“six degree of separation”.
On the other hand several, models have been proposed (prominently Watts and Stro-
gatz, 1998 and Newman and Watts, 1999) to construct complex networks with the small
world property. Mathematically, one requires that the average shortest path grows at most
logarithmic with respect to the network size, while the network still displays a large cluster-
ing coefficient. Namely, the network has an average shortest path comparable to that of a
random network, with the same number of nodes and links, while the clustering coefficient
is instead significantly larger.
In this section we present numerical results aimed at describing the time evolution of both
the average shortest path and the clustering coefficient of the social network emerging from
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the model. As before, the parameters are set so to induce the convergence to a consensus
state in the opinion space.
We will be particularly interested in their values at consensus, terming the associated
values respectively 〈`〉(Tc) and C(Tc) once the consensus state has been achieved.
In Fig. 2.4 we report these quantities (normalized to the homologous values estimated
for a random network with identical number of nodes and links) versus the system size,
computed using the adjacency matrix obtained by binarizing the affinity matrix as prescribed
in Remark 1 using a value of αf equal to 0.5 . The (normalized) clustering coefficient is
sensibly larger than one, this effect being more pronounced the smaller the value of αc. On
the other hand the (normalized) average shortest path is always very close to 1.
Based on the above we are hence brought to conclude that the social network emerging
from the opinion exchanges, has the small world property. This is a remarkable feature
because the social network evolves guided by the opinions and not result from an artificially
imposed recipe. The implications of these findings on real social networks deserve to be
further and deeply analyzed.
Weak ties
Social networks are characterized by the presence of hierarchies of well tied small groups of
acquaintances, that are possibly linked to other such groups via “weak ties”(Csermely, 2009).
According to Granovetter (1983) these weak links are fundamental for the cohesion of the
society, being at the basis of the social tissue, so motivating the statement “the strength of
weak ties”. Such phenomenon has been already shown to be relevant in social technological
networks by Onnela et al. (2007).
In general any structured social tissue, can be generically decomposed into commu-
nities (internally highly connected subgroups of affine individuals) weakly linked together,
generically called “small and closed social circles”or “acquaintances”versus “close friends”by
Granovetter (1983). To quantify these concepts, in the following, we invoke a strong working
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Figure 2.4: Normalized clustering coefficient (left panel) and normalized average mean path
(right panel) as functions of the network size at the convergence time. Parameters are
∆Oc = 0.5, σ = 0.5 and four values of αc have been used : (3) αc = 0, (4) αc = 0.25,
(2) αc = 0.5 and (©) αc = 0.75. Vertical bars are standard deviations computed over 10
repetitions. The adjacency matrix has been obtained from the affinity matrix using αf = 0.5.
hypothesis by requiring that agents belonging to each small and closed subgroup of size m
are indeed all linked together, thus defining a clique (see Albert and Baraba´si, 2002) of size
m, hereafter simply m-clique. A weaker request consists in assuming that just a subset of
all possible links are active. This alternative choice implies dealing with communities (see
Fortunato, 2010) rather than m–cliques, as it is instead the case in the following.
The degree of cliqueness of a social network is hence a measure of its cohesion/fragmentation:
the presence of a large number of m-cliques together with very few, m′-cliques, for m′ > m,
means that the population is actually fragmented into small pieces, of size m weakly inter-
acting with each other (Berlow,1999).
We are interested in studying such phenomenon within the social network emerging from
the opinion dynamics model here considered, still operating in consensus regime. To this
end we proceed as follows. We introduce a cut–off parameter αf used to binarize the affinity
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matrix, which hence transforms into an adjacency matrix a. More precisely, agents i and j
will be connected, i.e. aij = 1, if and only if αij ≥ αf . Once the adjacency matrix is being
constructed, we compute the number of m–cliques in the network; more precisely, because
a m′–clique contains several m–cliques, with m′ > m, to have a precise information about
the network topology, we count only maximal m–cliques, i.e. those not contained in any
m′–cliques with m′ > m. Let us observe that this last step is highly time consuming, the
clique problem being NP-complete. We thus restrict our analysis to the cases m ∈ {3, 4, 5}.
For small values of αf the network is almost complete, while for large ones it can in
principle fragment into a vast number of finite small groups of agents. As reported in the
inset of Fig. 2.5, for αf ∼ 1 only 3–cliques are present. Their number rapidly increases as
αf is lowered. On the other hand for αf ∼ 0.98 few 4–cliques emerge while 5–cliques appear
around αf ∼ 0.73. This means that the social networks is mainly composed by 3–cliques,
i.e. agents sharing high mutual affinities, that are connected together to form larger cliques,
for instance 4 and 5–cliques by weaker links, i.e. whose mutual affinities are lower than
the above ones. The network has thus acquired some non-trivial topology, starting from a
random one.
To critically examine our conclusions we compare our findings to that obtained for a
random network. This latter is made of a number of nodes and links identical to that of the
binarized social network. The social network displays many more cliques as compared to the
random reference case: the relative number of cliques goes from tens, for small αf amounts
to, hundreds for larger αf values (data not shown). On the other hand 4 and 5–cliques are
almost absent in the random network.
If we increase the value of σ, i.e. the social mixing effect, then we can show (results not
reported) that the weak ties phenomenon is prevented to occur. This is an interesting point
that will deserve future investigations, benchmarked to the relevant sociological literature.
CHAPTER 2. ENDOGENOUS SOCIAL NETWORKS AND OPINION EXCHANGE 54





























Figure 2.5: Number of maximal 3, 4 and 5–cliques in the social network once consensus has
been achieved. Parameters are N = 100, ∆Oc = 0.5, αc = 0.5 and σ = 0.5.
2.3 Conclusion
Social system and opinion dynamics models are intensively investigated within simplified
mathematical schemes. One of such model is here revisited and analyzed. The evolution of
the underlying network of connections, here emblematized by the mutual affinity score, is in
particular studied. This is a dynamical quantity which adjusts all along the system evolution,
as follows a complex coupling with the opinion variables. In other words, the embedding
social structure is adaptively created and not a priori assigned, as it is customarily done.
Starting from this setting, the model is solved analytically, under specific approximations.
The functional dependence on time of the networks mean characteristics are consequently
elucidated. The obtained solutions correlate with direct simulations, returning a satisfying
agreement. Moreover, the structure of the social network is numerically monitored, via a
set of classical indicators. Small world effect, as well weak ties connections, are found as an
emerging property of the model, contrary to other opinion dynamics models on non-trivial
network topology, for instance Kozma and Barrat (2008) and Holme and Newman (2006).
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We in fact repeated the present analysis for the case of the bounded confidence model of
Deffuant et al. (2000) and could not detected emerging topological structures as seen in the
affinity model, namely small world and weak ties phenomena. It could be speculated that the
richness of the model here inspected stems from its embedding dimensionality: opinion and
affinity evolve self–consistently in a two dimensional space, while the classical formulation a´
la Deffuant et al. (2000) is limited to a one dimensional setting.
It is remarkable that such properties, ubiquitous in real life social networks, are sponta-
neously generated within a simple scenario which accounts for a minimal number of ingre-
dients, in the context of a genuine self-consistent formulation.
2.4 Appendix - On the momenta evolution
The aim of this section if to present and sketch the proof of the result used to study the
evolution of the momenta of the affinity distribution. We refer the interested reader to
Carletti and Fanelli (2008) where a more detailed analysis is presented in a general setting.
For the sake of simplicity, let us label the N(N − 1) affinities values αij by xl, upon
assigning a specific re-ordering of the entries. Hence ~x is a vector with M = N(N − 1)
elements. As previously recalled (2.5), we assume each xl to obey a first order differential
equation of the logistic type, once time has been rescaled, namely:
dxl
dt
= xl(1− xl) . (2.9)
The initial conditions will be denoted as x0l .
Let us observe that each component xl evolves independently from the others. We can
hence imagine to deal with M replicas of a process ruled by (2.9) whose initial conditions are
distributed according to some given function. We are interested in computing the momenta
of the x variable as functions of time and depending on the initial distribution. The m-th
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momentum is given by:
〈xm〉(t) = (x1(t))
m + · · ·+ (xM (t))m
M
, (2.10)























xm−1l xl(1− xl) = m
(〈xm〉 − 〈xm+1〉) . (2.11)






This is a formal power series whose Taylor coefficients are the momenta of the distribution








By exploiting the evolution’s law for each xl, we shall here obtain a partial differential
equation governing the behavior of G. Knowing G will eventually enable us to calculate any
sought momentum via multiple differentiation with respect to ξ as stated in (2.13).













(〈xm〉 − 〈xm+1〉) , (2.14)
where used has been made of Eq. (2.11). We can now re-order the terms so to express the
right hand side as a function of G 4 and finally obtain the following non–homogeneous linear
partial differential equation:
∂tG− (ξ − 1)∂ξG = G
ξ
. (2.15)
4Here the following algebraic relations are being used:
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Such an equation can be solved for ξ close to zero (as in the end of the procedure we
shall be interested in evaluating the derivatives at ξ = 0, see Eq. (2.13) ) and for all positive




ξm〈xm〉(0) = Φ(ξ) , (2.16)
i.e. the initial momenta or their distribution.
Before turning to solve (2.15), we first simplify it by introducing
G = eg namely g = logG , (2.17)
then for any derivative we have ∂∗G = G∂∗g, where ∗ = ξ or ∗ = t, thus (2.15) is equivalent
to
∂tg − (ξ − 1)∂ξg = 1
ξ
, (2.18)
with the initial datum
g(ξ, 0) = φ(ξ) ≡ log Φ(ξ) . (2.19)




= −(ξ − 1) , (2.20)
which are explicitly integrated to give:
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where ξ(0) denotes ξ(t) at t = 0. Then the function u(ξ(t), t) defined by:




1 + (ξ(0)− 1)e−s ds , (2.22)
is the solution of (2.18), restricted to the characteristics. Observe that u(ξ(0), 0) = φ(ξ(0)),
so (2.22) solves also the initial value problem.
Finally the solution of (2.19) is obtained from u by reversing the relation between ξ(t)
and ξ(0), i.e. ξ(0) = (ξ(t)− 1)et + 1:
g(ξ, t) = φ
(
(ξ − 1)et + 1)+ λ(ξ, t) , (2.23)
where λ(ξ, t) is the value of the integral in the right hand side of (2.22).






















1 + (ξ(0)− 1)z
)
= − log z + log(1 + (ξ(0)− 1)z)
∣∣∣e−t
1
= t+ log(1 + (ξ(0)− 1)e−t)− log ξ(0) . (2.25)
According to (2.23) the solution g is then
g(ξ, t) = φ
(
(ξ − 1)et + 1)+ t+ log ξ − log((ξ − 1)et + 1) , (2.26)
from which G straightforwardly follows:
G(ξ, t) = Φ
(
(ξ − 1)et + 1) ξet
(ξ − 1)et + 1 . (2.27)
As anticipated, the function G makes it possible to estimate any momentum (2.13). As








1 + (ξ − 1)et) et ξet
(ξ − 1)et + 1
+ Φ
(
1 + (ξ − 1)et) et (ξ − 1)et + 1− ξet
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In the following section we shall turn to considering a specific application in the case of
uniformly distributed values of affinities.
Uniform distributed initial conditions
The initial data x0l are assumed to span uniformly the bound interval [0, 0.5], thus the
probability distribution ψ(x) clearly reads:
ψ(x) =
 2 if x ∈ [0, 1/2]0 otherwise , (2.29)








































1− z dz = −1−
1
y
log(1− y) , (2.32)
thus












(ξ − 1)et + 1
[
−1− 2
(ξ − 1)et + 1 log
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5We hereby assume to sample over a large collection of independent replica of the system under scrutiny
(M is large). Under this hypothesis one can safely adopt a continuous approximation for the distribution
of allowed initial data. Conversely, if the number of realizations is small, finite size corrections need to be
included(see Carletti and Fanelli, 2008).
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and thus recalling (2.13) we get
〈x〉(t) = e
t
et − 1 −
2et








(et − 1)2 +
4e2t







(et − 1)2(et + 1) .
Let us observe that 〈x〉(t) deviates from the logistic growth to which all the single variables
xi(t) do obey.
For large enough times, the distribution of the variable outputs is in fact concentrated
around the asymptotic value 1 with an associated variance (calculated from the above mo-
menta) which decreases monotonously with time.
Let us observe that a naive approach would suggest interpolating the averaged numerical
profile with a solution of the logistic model whose initial datum xˆ0 acts as a free parameter
to be adjusted to its best fitted value: as it is proven in Carletti and Fanelli (2008) this
procedure yields a significant discrepancy, which could be possibly misinterpreted as a failure
of the underlying logistic evolution law. For this reason, and to avoid drawing erroneous







CHAPTER 3. INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY UNDER ADAPTIVE
EXPECTATIONS AND CONFIRMATORY BIAS 62
3.1 Introduction
“Investing in speculative assets is a social activity. Investors spend a substantial part of
their leisure time discussing investments, reading about investments, or gossiping about
others’ successes or failures in investing. It is thus plausible that investors’ behavior (and
hence prices of speculative assets) would be influenced by social movements”
Shiller (1984)
In most economic interactions, individuals possess only partial information about the
value of exchanged objects. For instance, when a firm ”goes public”, i.e. launches an
initial public offering of its shares, none of participants in financial market has complete
information concerning the future value of the profit stream that the firm would generate.
The fundamental question, going back to Hayek (1945), is then: To which extent the market
can serve as the aggregator of this dispersed information? In other words, when is the
financial market informationally efficient, meaning that the market price converges over
time to the value that would obtain if all market participants had full information about the
fundamental value of the asset exchanged?
Most studies that address this question build on the assumption that individual market
participants are fully rational. Under full rationality, the seminal results on the informational
efficiency of centralized markets were established by Grossman (1976), Wilson (1977), Mil-
grom (1981), whereas for decentralized markets they have been proved by Wolinsky (1990),
Blouin and Serrano (2001), and Duffie and Manso (2007).
However, research in experimental economics and behavioral finance indicates that traders
do not behave in the way consistent with the full-rationality assumption. For instance, Rabin
and Schrag (1999) discuss the evidence that individuals suffer from the so-called confirma-
tory (or confirmation) bias: they tend to discard the new information that substantially
differs from their priors. One model that captures this kind of deviation from full rationality
is proposed by Brock and Durlauf (2001). They introduce a setup in which individual utility
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exhibits social interaction effects: the individuals desire to conform to the behaviour of the
social groups to which they belong. One requirement of this approach is that each agent
observes the behaviour of a large number of other individuals. As noted by Shiller (1984),
individuals actually update their prior information in (mainly bilateral) discussions with
others. Therefore conforming to some average ’social’ behaviour, or information, is unlikely
to occur in an environment consisting of bilateral interactions.
Along a different dimension, Haruvy et al. (2007) find that traders’ expectations are
adaptive, i.e. they give more importance to the past realized price of the asset than the
fully-rational agent would. This constitutes a deviation from full rationality because (under
full rationality) past prices cannot serve as predictors of future prices.
Understanding whether (and under which conditions) the financial markets are informa-
tionally efficient when agents do not behave fully rationally remains an open question. From
the policy perspective, it is important to understand if asset prices bubbles derive from
incomplete information (and therefore increasing information flows would solve the prob-
lem) or from the irrationality of agents (in which case a different policy approach should be
designed).
In this paper, we study the informational efficiency of a market with a single traded asset,
in which agents can have both the aforementioned forms of deviation from full rationality.
The price, which is a public information, initially differs from the fundamental value, about
which the agents have noisy private information (on average, correct). A fraction of traders
revise their price expectations in each period giving some weight to the past prices and also
exchanging opinions about future prices in a social interaction with another agent. Integrat-
ing new information from social interaction is subject to a certain degree of confirmatory
bias.
We show that, taken separately, each of the deviations from rationality worsen the infor-
mation efficiency of the market. However, when the two biases are combined, the degree of
informational inefficiency of the market (measured as the deviation of the long-run market
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price from the fundamental value of the asset) can be non-monotonic both in the weight of
the adaptive component and in the degree of the confirmatory bias. In other words for some
range of parameters, the two biases tend to mitigate each other’s effect, thus increasing the
informational efficiency.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 presents the setup of the model. Section
3.3 derives analytical results for each bias taken separately. In Section 3.4, we present
the simulation results when two biases are combined. Finally, Section 3.5 discusses the
implications of our results and suggests some future avenues for research.
3.2 The model
Consider a market with N participants, each endowed with an initial level of liquidity L0 > 0.
Time is discrete (e.g. to mimic the daily opening and closure of a financial market), denoted
with t = 0, 1, .... Market participants trade a single asset, whose price in period t we denote
with Pt. This price is public information. Prices are normalized in such a way that they
belong to the interval [0, 1].
At the beginning of each period t, every agent i can place an order to buy or short sell 1
unit of the asset, on the basis of her expectation about the price for period t, denoted with
P e,it . Placing an order implies a fixed (small but positive) transaction cost c, i.e. 0 < c 1.
At the end of the period, each agent i learns the price Pt at which the trade is settled (as
explained below).
The agent i then constructs her price expectation for the next period and decides to
participate in the trading in period t+ 1 according to the expected next-period gain, i.e. if∣∣∣P e,it+1 − Pt∣∣∣− c > 0 . (3.1)
Moreover, she participates as a buyer if her price expectation for the next period exceeds
the current price, i.e.
P e,it+1 > Pt , (3.2)
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or as a seller if, on the contrary,
P e,it+1 < Pt . (3.3)
The way in which agents form their next-period price expectations differs from the stan-
dard rational-expectation benchmark in the following way. First deviation is the fact that
agents give positive weight to the past public prices, i.e. they have (partially) adaptive
expectations. Secondly, they can influence each other’s expectations via social interactions
with confirmatory bias.
Formally, in every period a fraction, γ ∈ (0, 1], of the agents makes a revision of their
price expectations. An agent revises her price expectation by analyzing the past price of the
asset and by randomly encountering some other agent (at zero cost), and possibly sharing her
own price expectation with this partner. In these encounters, the agents have a confirmatory
bias, i.e. each agent tends to ignore the information coming from the other agent if it differs
too much from her own. If, on the contrary, this difference is not too large , i.e. smaller than
some fixed threshold, which we denote with σ, then the agent incorporates this information
into her price expectation. The remaining (1− γ)N agents do not revise their expectations
in the current period.
Summarizing, the expectation formation process of agent i meeting agent j is:
P e,it+1 = αPt + (1− α)

P e,it if
∣∣∣P e,it − P e,jt ∣∣∣ ≥ σ






and it is analogous for P e,jt+1. Here, α measures the relative weight of the past price. If
α = 1, the agents have purely adaptive expectations (and social interactions play no role).
If α = 0 and σ = 1 the agents (that revise their expectations) completely disregard the past
and fully integrate all the information coming from the social interactions. This latter case
corresponds to full rationality.
Our objective is to analyze the price formation under the different values of the param-
eters α, σ, and γ.
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Concerning the market microstructure, we assume that the market is centralized, with a
simple price response to excess demand (or supply). In other words, the market mechanism is
similar to the Walrasian auctioneer. More precisely, the price formation mechanism functions
as follows:
1. There exists a hypothetical price at period t + 1 that would equate the number of
buy-orders and sell-orders. Let us denote it with P ∗t+1. From (3.2) and (3.3), P ∗t+1 is
the solution of the equation:
nB(x) = nS(x) ,
where nB(x) and nS(x) are the numbers of buyers and sellers at price x. Whenever
there are several solutions to this equation, P ∗t+1 denotes the average of the values that
solve the equation.
2. Out of equilibrium, the price adjustment depends on the size of the excess demand or
excess supply relative to the size of the population; in other words, denoting β(x) =
|nB(x)− nS(x)| /N , the price adjustment process is:
Pt+1 = β(Pt)P
∗
t+1 + (1− β(Pt))Pt . (3.5)
Thus, the deviation from the equilibrium does not disappear instantly. However, the
price moves in the direction that eliminates the excess demand or supply, and, more-
over, the speed of adjustment depends on the size of disequilibrium (relative to the
size of the population) 1.
3. Given that each agent that participates in the market in period t places an order for
one unit of the asset, the number of exchanges that occurs is min{nB(Pt), nS(Pt)}.
Then, each seller i updates her liquidity by Lit+1 = L
i
t + Pt − c and, similarly, each
buyer by Ljt+1 = L
j
t − Pt − c.
1We avoid the shortcoming of assuming a constant β(Pt). As discussed by LeBaron (2001), if β(Pt) is
assumed to be constant, the behavior of the simulated market is extremely sensitive to the value of β, which
makes it difficult to interpret the results.
CHAPTER 3. INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY UNDER ADAPTIVE
EXPECTATIONS AND CONFIRMATORY BIAS 67
4. If an agent’s i liquidity dries up to zero, then she leaves the market. At her place,
at the beginning of the next period enters a new agent with liquidity L0, and the
next-period price expectation equal to P i0.
In this setting, consider an initial public offering (IPO) of the asset. At time t = 0, the
asset gets introduced in the market at some price P0. Let’s also suppose that, on average, the
agents have the unbiased information about its fundamental value. In particular, suppose
that the initial price expectations of the agents is a uniform distribution in the [0, 1] interval,
i.e. the fundamental value of the asset is 12 . However, the initial price P0 differs from the
fundamental value.
The questions that we pose are:
• Does the market price Pt converge to the fundamental value of the asset?
• If not, how large is the market inefficiency, namely the deviation in the long-run
(t→∞) of Pt from the fundamental value?
• How does this deviation depend on the weight of history α (i.e. the ”adaptiveness” of
agents’ expectations), the confirmatory bias of the traders (1− σ), and the frequency
with which agents adjust their expectations, γ?
Figure 4.1 gives a summary of the within-period timing of events of our model.
3.3 Analytical results
While a complete analytical study is beyond reach due to the non-linearity of this model,
we can nevertheless characterize analytically the answers to the above questions for some of
the values of the parameters. This requires a further assumption that the number of market
participants (N) and every agent’s initial liquidity (L0) are sufficiently large.
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Figure 3.1: Within-period timing of events
Purely adaptive expectations
Consider first the case where agents discard the social interactions and consider only the
past price. In other words, α = 1 in (3.4). We analyze separately two sub-cases: all agents
revise their expectations in every period, i.e. γ = 1; and only a fraction of agents revise
their expectations in every period, i.e. γ < 1.
All agents revise their expectations (γ = 1)
In this case Eq. (3.4) simply reduces to:
P e,it+1 = Pt for any i and t.
However, this is also the hypothetical price that equates buyers and sellers, i.e. P ∗t+1 = Pt,
and thus β(Pt) = 0. Finally, from (3.5) we get Pt+1 = Pt. This means that the market price
doesn’t evolve: Pt = P0 in every period. Intuitively, if all agents revise their expectations in
every period and have purely adaptive expectations, once the initial price P0 is announced,
every agent immediately revises her next-period expectation, substituting it with P0. Given
that every agents does so, no agent is interested in trading, and the price does not evolve.
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Only a fraction of the agents revise their expectactions (γ < 1)
In this second case let’s assume γ < 1, but γN being sufficiently large. Without loss
of generality, suppose that P0 > 1/2. We prove that the market reaches the long-run
equilibrium, after few periods, with the long-run market price deviating from the initial
price by a value smaller than c(1 − γ). Thus in this case the initial inefficiency remains
substantially unchanged.
We need the following preliminary result.
Proposition 1. Consider a population of agents divided into two groups: agents in the first
group, whose size is N1, have expectations uniformly distributed in [0, 1], while agents in the
second group, whose size is N2 >> N1, all have the price expectation equal to some fixed
Pˆ ∈ (0, 1). Then, the price P ∗ is given by P ∗ = Pˆ −c if Pˆ > 1/2 and P ∗ = Pˆ +c if Pˆ < 1/2.
If Pˆ = 1/2, then P ∗ = Pˆ .
Proof. We consider only the case Pˆ > 1/2 (the proof for the case Pˆ < 1/2 is analogous,
while the case Pˆ = 1/2 is trivial). Define the functions θc(x, P )
θc(x, P ) =

1 if x > P + c
0 otherwise
,
and ηc(x, P ) = 1− θ−c(x, P ). For a sufficiently large N2, the numbers of sellers and buyers
at price x ∈ [0, 1] are given by
nS(x) = (x− c)N1 +N2θc(x, Pˆ ) and (3.6)
nB(x) = (1− x− c)N1 +N2ηc(x, Pˆ ).
This follows from the trading protocol, given that for a price sufficiently close to Pˆ (i.e.
with a deviation less than c), only the first group of agents participates in the trading, and
that the expectations are uniformly distributed in the first group. On the other hand, if
x < Pˆ−c (or x > Pˆ+c), the second group also participates in the trading as buyers (sellers).
CHAPTER 3. INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY UNDER ADAPTIVE
EXPECTATIONS AND CONFIRMATORY BIAS 70
Then, the difference in the number of buyers and sellers is
∆(x) = (1− 2x)N1 +N2
(
ηc(x, Pˆ )− θc(x, Pˆ )
)
, (3.7)
and, therefore, P ∗ is the price at which the sign of ∆(x) changes (or the average of these
values, if more than one exist). We can then easily prove that
∆− ≡ lim
x→(Pˆ−c)−
∆(x) = (1− 2Pˆ + 2c)N1 +N2 > 0. (3.8)
Finally, using the assumption N2 >> N1, we get ∆− > 0 > ∆(x) for all x > Pˆ − c. This
implies that P ∗ = Pˆ − c.
This proposition induces the following corollary:
Corollary 2. Suppose the assumptions of Proposition 1 hold. If a third group of agents (of
arbitrary size) with price expectation P˜ , such that |P˜ − Pˆ | < c, joins the market, then P ∗
does not change.
We can now analyze the market dynamics under the assumptions α = 1 and γ < 1 with
γN large.
During the first period N1 = (1 − γ)N agents do not revise their expectations. These
expectations are uniformly distributed in [0, 1] interval. Contrarily, N2 = γN agents revise
their expectations, which now becomes the IPO price P0 (i.e. P
e,i
1 = P0). Proposition 1
ensures that P ∗1 = P0 − c. Moreover, the size of market disequilibrium is small: using the
definition, we get β(P0) = (2P0 − 1)(1− γ). Finally the price at the end of period 1 will be
P1 = β(P0)(P0 − c) + (1− β(P0))P0 = P0 − β(P0)c. (3.9)
Note that this price is c–close to P0, given that β(P0) is small.
During the next period, γN agents revise their expectations, while (1 − γ)N agents do
not revise. Then, on average, we have that the second group contains N2 = γ(1 − γ)N
agents, for which P e,i2 = P
e,i
1 = P0, the first group contains N1 = (1 − γ)2 agents (who do
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Figure 3.2: Purely adaptive expectations (α = 1). Left panel: semilog plot of the market
inefficiency as a function of γ. Right panel: time to convergence to the steady state as a
function of γ. There are N = 1000 agents, the transaction cost c = 0.005 and P0 = 0.8.
Each point represents the average over 50 simulations. © : numerical simulations, solid line
: analytical results (see Eq. 4.10 and 4.11 respectively)
.
not revise their initial expectations), and, moreover, there exists a third group of agents,
of size N3 = γN , for whom P
e,i
2 = P1 = P0 − β(P0)c. We can then apply Corollary 2 and
conclude that P ∗2 = P0 − c. Computing the next-period market disequilibrium β(P1), we
can easily observe that β(P1) ∼ (1− γ)2. Therefore, the next-period price P2 will be
P2 = β(P1)(P0− c) + (1− β(P1))P1 ∼ P0− β(P0)c+O(1− γ)2 ∼ P0− c(1− γ) +O(1− γ)2 .
(3.10)
Thus, the market price varies as long as there exist agents that have not yet revised their
initial expectations. However, the market price does not move too far from P0. Assuming
the extreme-case scenario where in every period the same (1 − γ) agents happen to be the
ones that do not revise their expectations, the number of periods that pass before the market
price converges to its steady-state value equals
− logN
log(1− γ) (3.11)
Numerical simulations presented in Figure 4.2 confirm our theoretical findings.
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Social interactions
We now, consider the setting where agents’ expectations have no adaptive component (i.e.
α = 0), and therefore agents that revise their expectations rely on the social interactions
with other agents. Then, the relevant parameter is the extent of the confirmatory bias
(1− σ). We derive analytical results for the cases of the extreme form of confirmatory bias
(σ << 1) and for that of virtually no bias (σ ∼ 1).
Social interactions: large confirmatory bias
Suppose that whenever two agents meet, neither of them adjusts her price expectation, no
matter how close their past-period expectations are. We will prove that the market is fully
informationally efficient in the long-run, but convergence to this efficient outcome takes
arbitrarily long time.
In every period, γN agents engage in social interactions (without influencing each other’s
price expectations). This implies that no agent revises her price expectation. Therefore,
the mean price expectation (which we denote with P˜ e) does not change either; namely,
from (3.4), P˜ et+1 = P˜
e
t . Under the assumption that the initial price expectations are uni-
formly distributed, we obtain P ∗t+1 = P˜ et+1 = 1/2. The market disequilibrium is thus given
by
β(Pt) = |1− 2Pt|. (3.12)




+ (1− |1− 2Pt|)Pt = Pt + |1− 2Pt|(1− 2Pt)
2
. (3.13)
Let us define the mapping
f(P ) =

P − (2P−1)22 if P ≥ 1/2
P + (2P−1)
2
2 if P < 1/2.
(3.14)
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P0 = 0.8 and σ = 5.0 · 10−4
P0 = 0.6 and σ = 5.0 · 10−4





































Figure 3.3: Social interaction without adaptive component (α = 0 and σ ∼ 0). Left panel:
semilog plot of the difference between the simulated and analytical market inefficiency with
σ = 5.0 · 10−4 and P0 = 0.6 or 0.8. Right panel: difference between the simulated and
analytical market inefficiency as a function of σ. There are N = 1000 agents, the transaction
cost c = 0.005.
The evolution of the market price is determined by the dynamic system
Pt+1 = f(Pt). (3.15)
This mapping has a unique fixed point at P = 1/2. Moreover, this is an attractor whose
strength decreases the closer we are to the fixed point: Pt − 1/2 ∼ a/t, the best fit being
a ∼ 0.455. Finally, note that if P0 = 1/2, then Eq. (3.13) implies that Pt = 1/2 for all
t. Figure 4.3 shows that our theoretical results approximate well the result of numerical
simulations.
Social interactions: small confirmatory bias
Let us now consider the opposite extreme, i.e. the agent that integrate into her expectation
the information coming from social interactions even when the partner’s expectations diverge
radically from hers. Assume for the moment that all agents revise their expectations in every
period (γ = 1). We will prove that in this case the market is fully informationally efficient in
the long-run, and that convergence to this efficient outcome occurs within in a finite number
of periods (that essentially depends on the transaction cost c).
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of [log2 ∆Pe(t)]/t as a function of σ (left panel) and as a function of γ
(right panel). There are N = 1000 agents, the transaction cost c = 0.005.
Given that the expectation-revision rule (3.4) with α = 0 and γ = 1 preserves the mean
price expectation, we trivially get: P˜ et+1 = P˜
e
t = 1/2.
This follows from the fact that the initial price expectations are uniformly distributed in
[0, 1], hence with average value 1/2, which also equals the hypothetical Walrasian-auctioneer
price P ∗t = 1/2. Moreover, the equation (3.4) implies that price expectations follow the Def-
fuant dynamic (Deffuant et al. 2000, Weisbuch et al. 2002). In other words, the dispersion
of price expectations, denoted with ∆Pe , shrinks to zero according to the following law (see





Since the transaction cost is positive, the market activity stops once all the expectations
fall inside the interval whose width is smaller than 2c. This happens after a time T̂ ∼
−2 (1 + log2 c).
Let us assume now that the price expectations have a dispersion large enough, so that the
market activity still does not stop. Then, we can easily compute the market disequilibrium
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Figure 3.5: Social interaction without adaptive component (α = 0 and σ ∼ 0). Left panel:
difference between the simulated and analytical market inefficiency as a function of σ. Right
panel: the ratio of the simulated time to convergence over the analytical one, σ. There are




which implies that the next-period price is given by:
Pt+1 = Pt + 2
t/2−1|1− 2Pt|(1− 2Pt). (3.17)
Let us introduce the auxiliary variable x, defined as Pt − 1/2 = xt/2t/2. This allows us









2x2 if x < 0.
(3.18)
This mapping has three fixed points: x = 0 (unstable), and x = ±(2 − √2)/4, that are
stable.
We can thus conclude that, as long as the market activity continues, the market price
converges to 1/2, given that in all cases Pt =
xt
2t/2
+ 12 → 12 . These findings are supported by
numerical simulations, whose results we report in Figure 4.5.
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In a similar fashion, we can study the case γ 6= 1. In this case, in every period γN agents
revise their expectations and, because they have a very small confirmatory bias (i.e. σ ∼ 1),
they influence substantially each other’s expectations. Then, overall there is a tendency
for the expectations to converge (because of the process driven by Eq. (3.4) with α = 0).
We should keep in mind, however, that in every period (1− γ)N agents do not revise their
expectations.
Zero weight given to the past prices in forming the next-period expectation (α = 0)
implies that the mean price expectation does not change, P˜ et+1 = P˜
e
t . Hence P˜
e
t = 1/2 and
P ∗t = 1/2 for all t. Moreover the expectations are distributed in an interval whose width
(denoted with ∆Pe(t)) shrinks to zero, but slower than in the case γ = 1. The simulations
presented in the right panel of Figure 4.4, allow us to see that this narrowing of expectation





where qγ = aγ + b, a = 0.61± 0.02 and b = −0.13± 0.01, independent of σ.
Let us observe that this equation for γ = 1 becomes the Eq. 3.16. Thus, the price
disequilibrium can be estimated as
β(Pt) ∼ 2qγt|1− 2Pt|,
which implies the following price dynamics:
Pt+1 = Pt + 2
qγt−1|1− 2Pt|(1− 2Pt).
Introducing a new variable yt such that Pt = 1/2+yt/2
qγt, we obtain the following difference
equation for the evolution of yt
yt+1 = 2
qγyt − 2qγ+1|yt|yy .
This mapping has three fixed points, y = 0 (unstable), and y = ±(1−2qγ )/2qγ+1 (stable).
We can finally conclude that, similar to the results above, the market price converges to 1/2
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as long as the market activity continues. The market activity stops once all the expectations
fall inside the interval whose width is smaller than 2c. This happens after time T̂ ∼ −(1 +
log2 c)/qγ .
3.4 Simulation results
When the price expectations of agents have both the adaptive component and confirmatory
bias, obtaining analytical results is beyond reach. We thus proceed by running numerical
simulations. In what follows, we vary the values of α and σ, from 0 to 1 (in steps of 0.01). For
each pair of values (α, σ) the market is simulated 10 times. The cost of a trading transaction
is fixed at c = 0.005. Each simulation runs for as many periods as it needs for the market
price to converge to steady state. Note that in the simulations we define the steady-state as
the situation in which the difference between the market prices in periods t and t+ 1 differ
by a value smaller than 10−6. We then look at the degree of informational inefficiency of
the market in the long-run, i.e. how much the market price diverges from the fundamental
value of the asset.
The agents have a relatively low level of liquidity. Remember that if the outcomes of the
trading strategy of a trader lead to losses that, accumulated over several periods, exhaust
her liquidity, she quits the market and is replaced by another trader with the same initial
price expectation P i0. Given that traders have a relatively low level of liquidity, a certain
number of them will quit the market and this implies that the turnover rate of traders is
relatively high. This means that some amount of noise gets continuously injected into the
market.
Figure 4.6 reports the informational inefficiency of the market (as measured by the
divergence of the asymptotic market price from the fundamental value of the asset) for the
cases in which the fraction of agents that revise their expectations in every period is γ = 0.2,
0.5, and 1, respectively (Panels A, B, and C). The market inefficiency is a function of the
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Figure 3.6: The degree of market inefficiency as a function of the adaptive component (α)
and the confirmatory bias (1−σ). Panel A: γ = 0.2, Panel B: γ = 0.5 and Panel C: γ = 1.0.
The initial price is 0.9. In the first row, (α, 1 − σ) ∈ [0, 1]. In the second row, focus on
α ∈ [0, 0.25], (1 − σ) ∈ [0.6, 1.0]. The values corresponding to the horizontal and vertical
lines are represented in 4.8 and 4.9 respectively.
weight of the adaptive component in the price expectations of traders α and of the degree
of confirmatory bias 1 − σ. Lighter colors indicate lower level of market inefficiency, while
darker ones indicate higher inefficiency. Figure 4.7 shows the average number of traders that
exit the market as their liquidity hits the zero bound. In both Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7
we focus on the interesting parameters set: the ones with large confirmatory bias and low
weight of the adaptive component. Let us observe that in the remaining range of parameters
α and σ the trend of market inefficiency (data not shown) is trivially monotonic.
Analyzing these figures, we obtain the following findings. Fixing the value of σ, as we
move from the extreme-left point (α = 0) to the right, the average deviation of the long-run
market price from the fundamental value first decreases and then increases - at least for
some values of σ (see Figure 4.8 for some characteristic cases). In other words:
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Figure 3.7: Average rate of exiting agents as a function of the adaptive component (α) and
the confirmatory bias (1 − σ). Panel A: γ = 0.2, Panel B: γ = 0.5 and Panel C: γ = 1.0.
The initial price is 0.9. Focus on: α ∈ [0, 0.25], (1− σ) ∈ [0.6, 1.0]

























Figure 3.8: The degree of market inefficiency as a function of the the weight of the adaptive
component (α). Dashed line: γ = 0.2, (1−σ) = 0.84; continuous line: γ = 0.5, (1−σ) = 0.84;
dash-and-dot line: γ = 1, (1− σ) = 0.90. Values correspond to the horizontal black lines in
Figure 4.6.
CHAPTER 3. INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY UNDER ADAPTIVE
EXPECTATIONS AND CONFIRMATORY BIAS 80
Proposition 3. Market inefficiency can be non-monotonic in the weight of the adaptive
component (α)
In all three panels of Figure 4.6, we find that for high values of α, the degree of the
informational inefficiency of the market is very high. Clearly, when traders put a large
weight to the past price in forming expectations, the initial price becomes very important.
When receiving information which indicates that the value of the asset is low (even in the
absence of confirmatory bias), traders tend to give little weight to it - basically, all that
matters is the past price. In this case, the initial price strongly influences the aggregate
expectation formation process (the expectations of all agents quickly converge upwards to
some point between the initial price and the fundamental value) and, given that in our case
the initial price strongly differs from the fundamental value, the long-run market price stays
largely above the fundamental value.
Consider now the situation with the most extreme form of confirmatory bias, i.e. all
traders completely ignore the information that comes from others. As α declines, the traders
give less weight to the past prices and more weight to their own expectations of the previous
period. Therefore, the agents whose initial expectations are very low do not move their
next-period expectations upwards too much. At the same time, the market price keeps
falling, driven by the Walrasian auctioneer (which also implies the downward move in the
expectations of the agents whose initial expectations are high). These two inter-related
processes - the upward drift of price expectations of initially low-expectation agents and
the downward pressure on the market price - converge to some value relatively close to the
fundamental one.
As α declines further, we observe that the market inefficiency rises again. This is due to
the fact that for the lower values of α, the first process (upward move in expectations of the
initially low-expectation agents) becomes slower than the second one (i.e. downward move in
the market price). Thus, the low-expectation agents keep making negative profits, eventually
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hit the zero-liquidity bound, and exit (we can note this by looking at Figure 4.7: the number
of agents that exit the market increases for values of the parameters corresponding to the
top-left part of the figure). There is a sufficiently high exit rate of these agents from the
market so as to soften the downward move in the market price, which means that the long-
run price at which the market settles down is higher than in the situation in which the exit
of traders is negligible.
As the degree of confirmatory bias of agents becomes smaller (i.e. the value of σ in-
creases), the channel that leads to the exit of low-expectation traders softens, as there is
now an additional mechanism that creates an upward pressure on the expectations of those
traders: the integration of information that comes from their peers. Notice (Figure 4.7) that
the exit rate is lower at the higher values of σ.
Furthermore, comparing across the three panels of Figure 4.6, one notes that as the
fraction of agents that revise their expectations in each period (γ) increases, the areas of σ
in which the non-monotonicity in α occurs becomes smaller:
Proposition 4. The tendency of the market inefficiency to be non-monotonic in α is
stronger, the lower is the fraction of agents that revise their price expectations in each period.
This happens because the higher frequency of expectation revision (larger γ) and the
likelihood to integrate the information coming from other traders (larger σ) act in a comple-
mentary fashion: if the rate of revision of price expectations is relatively low, the ”openness
of mind” (i.e. low degree of confirmatory bias) has a relatively small effect on the mitigation
of the exit channel. It is only when the agents revise their expectations relatively frequently,
that the ”openness of mind” starts to have a real bite, and the upward-sloping part on the
left side of the relation between market inefficiency and α starts to disappear.
Let’s now fix the value of α = 0.1 on Figure 4.6A, α = 0.05 on Figure 4.6B, and α = 0.01
on Figure 6C (results for these specific cases are reported in Figure 4.9). As we move from
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the point at the top (σ = 0) downwards, the market inefficiency first decreases and then
increases. In other words:






















Figure 3.9: The degree of market inefficiency as a function of the confirmatory bias (1− σ).
Continuous line: α = 0.10, γ = 0.2; dashed line: α = 0.05, γ = 0.5; dash-and-dot line:
α = 0.01 γ = 1. Values correspond to the vertical black lines in Figure 4.6.
Proposition 5. Market inefficiency can be non-monotonic in the degree of confirmatory
bias (1− σ).
The first part of the non-monotonic relationship is easy to explain: as an agent suffers
less from confirmatory bias, she starts to integrate at least some of the information about
the fundamentals contained in the price expectations of another trader (incidentally, this
phenomenon occurs only when the adaptive component in the price expectation is relatively
small).
But why the market inefficiency would rise as the agents become even more ”open-
minded”? To understand this, we need to note that this phenomenon occurs only when the
adaptive component is not too small. Then, the fact that the initial price differs substantially
from the fundamental value plays a key role. The agents have an early-stage upward drift in
expectations. At the same time, the market price starts to fall. If the agents are very ”open-
minded”, this implies that they ’excessively’ integrate the early upward price drift into their
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expectations, which, in turn, implies that the price at which the market settles in the long
run is relatively high. If, instead, the agents’ confirmatory bias is stronger, the decline in
the market price is faster than the ’propagation’ of the upward-drifting expectations: this is
why the market settles at the price relatively close to the fundamental value.
This analysis suggests a very interesting and potentially more general insight: when
market participants suffer from more than one deviation from fully rational behavior (in our
case, adaptive expectations and confirmatory bias), at least in some range of parameters,
the two biases mitigate each other. Given our analysis, it should not be difficult to construct
examples of asset markets with traders that have multiple sources of bias, that exhibit the
same price behavior as under full rationality, and in which the price behavior would deviate
from the full-rationality benchmark as soon as one of the bias sources is eliminated.
Next, looking across the three panels of Figure 4.6, we also note that the values of α
at which we have found the non-monotonicity of the market inefficiency decrease at higher
values of γ. In other words:
Proposition 6. The weight of the adaptive component in the expectations (α) at which the
non-monotonicity of the market inefficiency in the degree of confirmatory bias gets smaller
when the fraction of agents that revise their expectations increases.
To capture the intuition behind this result, we need to conduct the following thought
experiment. Let’s fix a point with sufficiently high values of α and σ, for example (0.4, 0.4).
Next, let’s increase the frequency of revision of expectations by the agents, from γ = 0.2 to
γ = 1. We then observe that the market inefficiency increases. This indicates the importance
of the frequency with which agents revise their price expectations for the propagation of the
’excessive’ integration of the upward drift into the expectations, as noted above. In other
words, at higher frequency of expectation revision, this ’excessive’ integration of the upward
drift channel swamps the opposite (i.e. the quantity-of-information) channel more easily.
The quantity-of-information channel starts to play a role only when the early-stage upward
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drift is sufficiently small (i.e., history weighs relatively little in the expectation formation).
If we measure the degree of market inefficiency, while varying σ along a fixed α, in ranges
different from those where the non-monotonicity occurs (for example, α = 0.1 and α = 0.3
on Figure 4.6A), we see that at the higher values of α the relationship between the degree
of market inefficiency and σ is negative, while at the lower values of α, this relationship is
positive. In other words:
Proposition 7. The slope of the relationship of market inefficiency in the degree of con-
firmatory bias (σ) can be of opposite sign at different values of the weight of the adaptive
component (α).
The above discussion has already hinted at the potential explanation why this reversal
of the relationship occurs. At sufficiently high values of α, the early-stage upward drift is
very important and the smaller confirmatory bias of agents only helps to propagate this
drift into the price expectations. At sufficiently low values of α, the early-stage upward drift
matters much less and the smaller confirmatory bias becomes beneficial for the informa-
tional efficiency of the market, because it helps to integrate more of the relatively unbiased
information into the expectations. In other words, in both cases the smaller confirmatory
bias (i.e. higher σ) plays the role of the catalyzer; what differs in the two cases is the initial
unbiasedness of expectations.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper has studied the informational efficiency of an agent-based financial market with
a single traded asset. The price initially differs from the fundamental value, about which the
agents have noisy private information (which is, on average, correct). A fraction of traders
revise their price expectations in each period. The price at which the asset is traded is
public information. The agents’ expectations have an adaptive component (i.e. the past
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price influences their future price expectations to some extent) and a social-interactions
component with confirmatory bias (i.e. agents exchange information with their peers and
tend to discard the information that differs too much from their priors).
We find that the degree of informational inefficiency of the market (measured as the
deviation of the long-run market price from the fundamental value of the asset) can be
non-monotonic both in the weight of the adaptive component and in the degree of the
confirmatory bias. For some ranges of parameters, two biases tend to mitigate each other’s
effect, thus increasing the informational efficiency.
Our findings complement the well-known results in the theory of markets showing that
the allocative efficiency can be obtained even under substantial deviation from individual
rationality of agents (Gode and Sunder 1993, 1997). We show that deviations from indi-
vidual rationality, under certain conditions, can also facilitate the informational efficiency
of markets. The key condition for this property is that the various behavioral biases that
agents possess should mutually dampen their effects on the price dynamics.
Given the potential importance of this insight for financial economics, the natural exten-
sion of this work is to test its predictions experimentally. This would require to construct
experimental financial markets with human traders, similar to the setting of Haruvy et al.
(2007), with the additional feature of allowing agents to share their information (in some re-
stricted form). The outcomes of interest in such an experiment would be both the evolution
of market price of the asset and the elicited price expectations of traders.
Chapter 4
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4.1 Introduction
How are the levels of corruption and embezzlement of a political system influenced by elec-
toral campaigns? How rent extraction can be reduced with anti-corruption policies? We an-
swer these questions with a model characterized by the absence of political pressure groups
and by the presence of ideological voters whose preferences can be manipulated, by political
candidates, through campaign spending. With respect to the present literature, we introduce
an important innovation in our model, allowing the voters to directly gain (dis-)utility from
the electoral campaign expenditures of the candidates through ”participation excitement”
(or ”disenfranchisement feeling” if the utility is negative).
The problem we study contributes to the analysis of the agency costs of political dele-
gation, addressed mainly by the literature on electoral competition with opportunistic (or
rent-seeking) candidates. The debate on this issue has, until now, neglected the study of
the effects of campaigns on voters. Indeed, this strand of literature focuses on how the
conflicts of interests among heterogeneous voters (with different preferred policies), on one
side, and between candidates (that seek to maximize the rent extracted from office) and
voters (which would like to see this rents minimized), on the other side, play out and some-
times allow politicians to overtax citizens to finance their own private consumption. On the
subject, two schools of thought exists. According to Wittman (1989, 1995), the forces of
electoral competition, creating very strong incentives for the candidates to propose policies
that please the voters as much as possible 1, are enough to reduce rent extraction to zero.
However, as noted by Polo (1998), the efficient outcome strongly depends on the efficiency of
the electoral competition, which in turn, is deeply influenced by the type of the information
candidates have about the voters’ preferences. When this knowledge is not perfect (i.e.,
in the presence of information asymmetries), rent extraction is possible. Another channel
through which political rents can emerge, studied by Persson and Tabellini (1999), is the
1This is true, in particular, when the electoral competition is tough, for example when voting happens
through a majority rule and the winner does not have to share the power with the loser (winner-take-all).
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presence of ideology in voters preferences. Indeed, ideology makes elections more certain,
reducing voters elasticity to the quality of party platforms (i.e., increased rent extraction).
We build on the setups of Polo and Persson-Tabellini, introducing the possibility for the
candidates to do a costly electoral campaign, to analyze how this affects the rent extraction
behaviour of the politicians. We use the ideology of voters to introduce an heterogeneity in
the effect that the electoral campaign of the candidates has on voters with different political
views.
The empirical literature (Kaid, 1987 and Johnson-Cartee, 1989) suggests that campaign
spending influences the political bias of the voters thus providing an incentive, for candidates,
to use their resources in order to increase the probability of being elected. In this paper, we
consider two channels through which expenditures affects voters’ choices. First, following
the findings of Palda and Palda (1998), the popularity of the candidate that spends more is
increased. Second, the campaign affects each single voter utility function. Indeed, following
Freie (1997) who observes that an active campaign - in contested and democratic elections
- leads to an increased feeling of integration of voters in the political community to which
they belong, we consider this second effect a consequence of the presence of ”procedural
concerns” in the voters. Moreover, in accordance with Matthews (1998) which claims that
voters care about the source of campaign expenditures that they observe, our voters will
integrate (in their utility functions) more the expenditures of the candidate they favor than
those of the one they oppose. While we mainly consider the case in which they enjoy the
electoral campaign, our model easily accommodates situations in which voters dislike the
campaign spending. In this case, the electoral campaigns bring the voters a disutility which
represents the process of disenfranchisement of the electoral body in modern democracies.
Our setup is rather simple. Two rent-seeking candidates decide on binding platforms
which are composed of public goods, rent extraction and investments in an electoral cam-
paign. On the base of these platforms the voters, influenced by the electoral campaign,
decide rationally which candidate to elect. The latter will then enforce his platform as
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promised.
Our main finding is that, surprisingly, the electoral campaign does not affect the amount
of rent that is ex-ante announced by the candidates (i.e., the gross rent). However, the
investment of resources implied by the campaign reduces the amount of rent available, ex-
post, for the candidate elected (i.e., the net rent, which is what is left of the gross rent
after the electoral campaign has been paid for). Moreover, the political campaign does not
influence the ex-post probability of being elected (confirming the stylized fact observed by
Levitt, 1994).
The presence of an element of excitement of the electoral body, as a result of the electoral
campaign, implies that our model predicts that the expenditures in political advertisement
should be higher than in the absence of such element.
Since positive net rents can be observed in our model, we then study which kind of policies
can be implemented in order to reduce or eliminate them. Our main policy suggestion is
to implement an additional tax aimed at reducing the incentives to rent extraction of the
candidate. We find that such tax can, under some conditions, improve the welfare of the
voters. Nevertheless, if the tax is too small then it reduces the incentives to campaign,
making both candidates better off. Finally, we observe that such a policy is difficult to
implement in countries with high income inequalities. On this regard we produce a testable
prediction: in the presence of high levels of corruption or high income inequalities, the anti-
corruption policies implemented by local politicians will be ineffective or too costly to gain
popular support.
Given our assumptions, our analysis applies to democratic countries where, compared
to other sources of campaign finance (such as corruption, donations from single citizens or
public funding), the money that special interest groups donate (or are allowed to donate)
to political parties and candidates is limited. Moreover, concerning corruption it is clear
that the empirical predictions and the policy suggestions of this paper are more relevant for
countries where this phenomenon is endemic. Finally, for the part relative to the presence of
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”campaign excitement”, the attention should be focused on those countries where the voters
have a relatively positive view of politics 2. In Figure 1 we propose a map of the countries
where these conditions apply.
While it is difficult to gather internationally comparable systematic data on the main
sources of campaign finance, a study of the electoral laws (we use the Political Finance
Database 2012, published by I.D.E.A. [132] as proxy for the limitation of the lobbies’ role),
together with the data on corruption perception (we use the Corruption Perception Index
2010, published by Transparency International [133] as proxy for the level of corruption in a
country) in the world allows us to select the approximate set of countries to which our model
applies. Some of the most fitting examples of this kind of countries are: the new democratic
Egypt (a country where surely people are still excited about politics), Russia, Thailand and
most of South America (see Figure 4.1).
Given that we assume that the voting takes place with the majority rule, the primary
interest of this paper are those counties where the political competition is between two
parties. However, the main results hold, with minor modifications, if applied to political
systems with more than two parties, provided that two of them dominate.
For the rest of this paper, we proceed as follows: first we discuss the related literature
in Section 4.2, then, building on the framework of inefficient electoral competition of Polo
(1998), Persson and Tabellini (2000) and detailing the new features discussed, we outline
the model in its mathematical details (Section 4.3) and we derive the results (Section 4.4).
Finally, we discuss how some public policies can increase the welfare of the players (Section
4.5) and we conclude (Section 4.6). Proofs of the propositions can be found in the Appendix
(Section 4.7).
2One should not be too restrictive on this issue. Indeed, changing the value of the parameters that
measure the effectiveness of campaign spending, we are able to capture results relevant also for countries with
a significative level of detachment from politics, or even situations in which political campaign is actively
disliked by the voters.





Figure 4.1: This map gives a graphical representation of the countries to which our setup
applies best. The countries colored in the darker blue are those where: the public perception
of corruption is medium/high (i.e., the Corruption Perception Index 2010 is below 7) and
where the electoral law imposes some type of limitation to contribution that political parties
can obtain from lobbies. The countries colored in the lighter blue are those that fail to meet
this criteria.
4.2 Related Literature
Political competition and more generally representative democracy, where policy choices are
delegated to elected officials, is generally considered as an efficient mechanism to aggre-
gate the preferences of large social groups. However, while the possibility of taking policy
decisions should be the main reason to run for elective offices, the causality is often re-
versed: policy announcements are a way to get elected. Several theoretical reasons for this
phenomenon have been proposed. In highly competitive elections the satisfaction of the
preferences of the median voter (Black, 1948) is required in order to obtain the majority
of votes and win the elections (Downs, 1957) so potential candidates with strong policy
motivation may opt-out from the political process. Also, candidates could be motivated by
the prestigiousness of the office or by the possibility, once elected, of diverting part of the
public resources for private use.
This latter approach is the one adopted by the literature on the agency costs of political
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delegation. Candidates are considered as rent maximizer leviathans with the only objective of
being elected and to divert as much as possible of the public budget for private consumption.
This literature, assuming a principal-agent approach, focuses on the conflict of interests
that arise between the voters (principals) and the candidates (agents). Indeed, while the
formers would like the rents to disappear, the latter try to maximize them. Whether the
candidates manage to get away with a positive rent or not depends mainly on the information
structure of the political game. Wittman (1989, 1995) suggests that the forces of the electoral
competition are sufficient to obtain a socially efficient outcome. He shows that the need to get
the majority of votes gives a very strong incentive to politicians to trade lower rents with the
possibility of election. However, as noted by Polo (1998), this efficient outcome relies heavily
on the assumption that the candidates know perfectly the voters’ utility (including the
median voter’s preferences). When this assumption is relaxed, candidates become uncertain
about the voters’ evaluation of the their characteristics (i.e., about their relative popularity),
as observed in Grillo and Polo (1993), Polo (1998) and Myerson (1993) 3 and positive rents
can emerge in equilibrium. This is because the uncertainty relaxes the competition for the
median voter.
Another channel, through which rents can emerge, is the presence of an ideological com-
ponent in the preferences of the voters. Indeed, if voters have some idiosyncratic inclination
for one of the candidates, as in Persson and Tabellini (1999), their elasticity to changes in
the platforms of the candidates becomes lower, so that the marginal cost of less attractive
policy choices becomes smaller.
With respect to this literature, our paper introduces several innovations. The first is
that candidates do not take their relative popularity as given, but they are able to influence
it through a costly electoral campaign. Indeed, Palda and Palda (1998), studying empir-
ically the relationship between electoral results and candidates expenditures, noticed that
3This issue is also discussed by Svennson (1997), although in his model the rent seekers are bureaucrats
which can afterwards be bailed out by politicians.
CHAPTER 4. CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND RENTS IN A PROBABILISTIC VOTING
MODEL 93
outspending the opponent brings significative advantages in terms of election probability,
thus creating a strong incentive to invest in campaign. In our setup, the electoral campaign
influences the propensity of the electoral body through a mechanism similar to the one in-
troduced by Baron (1994) i.e., moving the distribution of the possible popularities in the
direction of the candidate that overspend the opponent. The second innovation we introduce
is the fact that the electoral campaign also affects the single voter’s utility function directly.
Freie (1997) shows that the presence of active campaigns, in free and contested elections,
induces the citizens to feel more integrated in the political community, thus increasing their
utility. This ”excitement of participation” does not correspond to a monetary transfer of
resources from candidates to voters, and it is inspired by the concept of ”procedural utility”,
introduced by Frey et Al. (2004) and by Frey and Stutzer (2000, 2005)4. These authors
argue that economic agents do not only care about outcomes, but also about the way in
which those outcomes are achieved. A more democratic system, where plenty of occasions
to participate to campaign events are offered and more advertisements are shown, makes the
voters feel more involved and, as such, is preferred to an apathetical electoral campaign 5.
However, while the excitement of participation (caused by the expenditures of one candi-
date) involves all the voters, it is reasonable to assume that the extent to which it is enjoyed
depends on their political bias.
A different perspective on the effects of electoral campaign on voters choices is the one
of the literature on political advertisements. Most of the contributions deal with the rela-
tionship among special interest groups, candidates and voters. They focus on the trade off
between the policy cost, imposed by lobbies on citizens as they bias the policy choices of
the candidates in their direction, and the informational gains obtained by the voters as a
consequence of the interaction between the other two types of agents. Since we neglect the
4Notice that the term procedural fairness is also used in welfare economics with another meaning, which
is not relevant here.
5When given the opportunity, as empirically shown by Wielhouwer and Lockerbie (1994), voters do
mobilize and participate more to the political process.
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role of lobbies, this trade off does not concern us directly. Nevertheless, this literature is
interesting for our scopes since it allows us to gain insights into the channels (other than
those discussed) through which electoral campaigns affect voting choices. The papers on the
issue can be essentially divided in two classes. Some authors (such as Prat, 2001; Wittman,
2007 and Potters, Sloof and Winden, 1997) assume that voters, knowing that candidates
just want to be elected, do not believe in the content of the propaganda, thus these adver-
tisements do not directly modify their behaviour. At the opposite, some other authors (such
as Austen-Smith, 1987; Coate, 2004 and Grossman and Helpman, 2001) define the electoral
campaign of the candidate as informative for the voters.
Belonging to the first class is Prat (2001). According to him, the main effect of political
advertisements is to allow voters to gain information about the qualities of the candidates.
An expensive electoral campaign signals to the voters that the candidate is efficient in obtain-
ing funds indirectly indicating that he is a good administrator. An alternative, but similar,
mechanism through which this information can be transmitted is the direct endorsement of
candidates by political pressure groups (Wittman, 2007). A common trait of all these studies
is that the only way in which a candidate can obtain funds to run advertisements is through
contributions from lobbies which are then shown to be pivotal in solving the signaling prob-
lem between candidates and voters. This result is driven by the assumption that the quality
of the candidates is, ex-ante, observable by the political insiders. When this is not the case -
as assumed in our paper - the informative gains for the population disappear. Moreover, we
abstract from the role of lobbies, focusing on the situations in which their contribution to
campaigns are relatively limited when compared with those that the candidate can obtain
through other sources. This usually happens, as briefly discussed in the introduction, when
the role of special interest groups is legally restricted.
The irrelevance of the pressure groups in a context where these are not more informed
about candidates’ valences than the rest of the voters extends to the situation in which
electors consider the advertisements of the politicians to be informative (i.e., to broadcast
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contents useful for their decision). However, in this case (studied by Austen-Smith, 1987
and Coate, 2004) another mechanism through which electoral campaigns influence voters’
choices emerges. In these models, candidates still try to attract funds from lobbies but
they do so in order to reduce the ”error” with which the voters perceive the candidate’s
proposals. This reduces the risk, perceived by the risk-adverse voters, that the candidate is
poorly qualified. While we do not model voters as explicitly risk-adverse or skeptical about
the content of the advertisements, our assumption that voters draw direct utility from the
electoral campaign can be interpreted to emulate, in other terms, these two links between
campaign expenditures and voters’ choices. Indeed, they both result in voters preferring the
candidate that invests more in electoral campaign.
This paper draws inspiration from some stylized facts, revealed by the empirical and
experimental analysis, and with its results contributes to give a theoretical foundation the
some other empirical observation. As noticed by Kaid (1987) and Johnson-Cartee (1989) a
campaign influences the political preferences of voters. These authors, studying in particular
negative campaigning, find that voters recall negative advertisements even if they dislike
them. They show that negative advertisements reduce the image evaluation of targeted
politician, both for voters with bias toward and against the targeted candidate. As discussed,
this stylized fact is integrated here in the way the electoral body is biased in the direction
of the candidate that spends more.
Our decision of introducing an heterogeneous reaction of voters to the campaigns of
different candidates, is supported by the social psychology literature which presents evidence
that voters do care about the source of the campaign expenditure. Indeed, Matthews (1998)
finds that advertisements have a significative effect on the perception of the member of a
group toward the sponsor that paid for it.
Finally, Valentino et al. (2004)’s empirical analysis suggests that, while exposure to po-
litical advertisements can be considered informative and may help to reduce informational
gaps between informed and uninformed citizens, it does not produce large shifts in the rank-
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ing of the candidates preferred by a given elector. Similar results are obtained, at a more
aggregate level, by Levitt (1994), which confirms that when the candidates spend similar
amounts, the absolute level of expenditure has little effect on the probability of election.
With the results of our model we reproduce these last two stylized facts thus contributing
provide a theoretical justification for them.
4.3 The model
We assume the existence of two candidates, indexed J = {A,B}, running for an elective
office with a majority voting procedure. Each of the candidates must commit to a binding
electoral platform (qJ) composed of three elements: the amount of public goods provided
(gJ), the amount of rent extracted from office (rJ) and the amount invested in electoral
campaign (ΨJ). The two candidates are assumed to be equal in terms of their ability to
provide public goods, to extract rents and in the efficiency of their electoral campaign.
The campaigning costs are assumed quadratic (convex). This reflects that, regardless of
the amount invested, the candidate has only a limited amount of energy to spend in the
campaign (if we think about television advertisements: it takes time to register television
appearances and the time on television is limited while, for political rallies, a candidate can
participate only to a limited amount of them). Each candidate is motivated uniquely by
the perspective of holding the office and extracting rent from his tenure. The extraction
of monetary rents is subject to a transaction cost γ ∈ [0, 1], which comes as a consequence
of the checks and balances characteristic of the political system, and of the fact that the
candidates will need to corrupt other members of the administration in order to transform
the overtaxation, that they impose on voters, into private consumption. In our specification,
the higher is γ, the higher is the efficiency with which the candidate performs this operation.
Finally, from the simple fact of holding the office a politician obtains a non-monetary rent
R (ego-rent) which is exogenous and depends on how prestigious is the office. Assuming
CHAPTER 4. CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND RENTS IN A PROBABILISTIC VOTING
MODEL 97
an electoral competition between two politicians, the objective function of the candidates,
which they try to maximize, is:
max
gJ ,rJ ,ΨJ
E[vJ ] = pJ(gJ , rJ ,ΨJ)(R+ γrJ)−Ψ2J (4.1)
where pJ is the probability of election. With respect to Equation 4.1, it should be noted
that,while the rent (rJ) is enjoyed only with probability pJ , the candidate has to pay for his
electoral campaign even when he is not elected. For simplicity, we assume that candidates
are rich enough to advance the amount ΨJ or that there is some form of public intervention
that lends them, without interests, the money required during the campaign (provided that
the expenses do not exceed the expected income).
Moreover, the candidates are characterized by a relative popularity (δ) vis-a`-vis the
electorate, about which they are uncertain at the moment they announce their platforms.
Indeed, δ is composed of two additively separable parts. The first is a random shock δ˜,
common to all voters, assumed to be drawn from a uniform distribution symmetric around
zero and with support
[− 12Ω , 12Ω]. In this distribution the parameter Ω is the density, which
measures the degree of uncertainty of the candidates about the electoral body’s propensity
toward or against them. Higher values for this parameter correspond to lower levels of
uncertainty. The second component of δ is deterministic. Indeed, under the assumption
that campaign expenditures are effective in modifying the choices of the electorate, this
component shifts the support of the previous distribution in the direction of the candidate
that spends more in political advertisements. Joining these two components, the popularity
of the candidates will be then extracted from the distribution δ = δ˜+h(ΨB−ΨA), where h is
a parameter that expresses the marginal effect of the difference in advertisements spending
on the electoral body’s propensity to favour one of the candidates. Indeed, if A outspends
B the popularity distribution shifts to the left (the direction that favours A’s chances of
election) and vice versa if B outspends A.
The candidates are elected by the electoral body I composed of a large number of voters
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i ∈ I. Each voter is characterized by an income yi and a political bias σi, with the two
dimensions assumed to be uncorrelated (or, equivalently, if a correlation exists, candidates
are not aware of it). The income determines the preference for the provision of public goods,
and it is distributed according to some P.D.F. F (yi), with full support and of class C
2. The
political bias, σi, is the preference of the voter for the non-economic ideologies of the parties
that express the candidates. We assume that σi is distributed in the population according
to a uniform distribution centered in zero and with support
[
− 12φ , 12φ
]
. The parameter φ
is the degree of political polarization in the society. The political bias can be considered
as the degree of similarity between the ideological position of the voter and the one of the
parties that express the candidates. Indeed, while the candidates are themselves purely
opportunistic, they can only decide the economic policy and they are attached to political
parties (which are, formally, the same in our model) which express some well characterized
position on non-economic issues (e.g., abortion, gay marriages, immigration etc.). In this
sense the voters are distributed according to the degree to which they agree or disagree with
party ideologies.
However, the decision of a voter to choose one of the candidates is not purely ideological,
but also depends on the platform that the latter announce (q). His income is reduced by
τ , the taxed levied by the elected candidate and, everything else being equal, his utility
becomes smaller when the tax rate increases. The resource gathered with the taxation can
be used in two ways: to finance the private consumption of the candidate (r) or to provide
public goods (g), thus τ = g + r. All voters agree that r is a bad and all of them prefer
platforms which involve less rent extraction. On the contrary, the part of the taxes that goes
in the provision of public goods provides a positive utility to voters through a production
function H(g). The latter is equal for every voter and assumed to be strictly increasing
(Hg > 0) and strictly concave (Hgg < 0).
The campaign expenditures of the candidates (Ψ) influence directly the voters. Specif-
ically, each voter perceives differently the expenditures of the two candidates: he values
CHAPTER 4. CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND RENTS IN A PROBABILISTIC VOTING
MODEL 99
values the expenditures more if they come from his favorite candidate than if they come
from the opponent. In our specification the weight assigned by a voter to the investment of
a candidate grows linearly with the strength of the bias of the latter toward the former 6.
The effectiveness of the campaign in generating excitement in the voter (ζ ∈ [−1, 1]) is as-
sumed to be equal for all voters and candidates. With this specification of ζ we are able
to capture both the case in which campaign generates genuine excitation and participation
- thus increasing utilities - and the one in which it creates disutility, progressively detach-
ing voters from politics (this second situation is frequently observed in the more advanced
democracies, where is sometimes associated to a drop in the turnout).
Finally, in order to simplify the notation, we transform the political bias of the voter in a
value on the segment [0, 1]. The relative distance of a voter with bias σi with respect to the




The distance from the ideological position of the party of candidate B is then defined by the
complement to one of dAi , i.e. d
B
i = 1− dAi .
With these elements we can now express the utility function of voter i, assumed to be
quasi linear and separable in three parts, vis-a`-vis the platforms of the candidate J :
W iJ(gJ , rJ ,ΨJ) = (y − gJ − rJ)
yi
y
+H(g) + ζ(1− dJi )ΨJ (4.2)
Thus, when evaluating the platforms of the two candidates, the voter will compare the
following two expressions:
W iA(gA, rA,ΨA) = (y − gA − rA)
yi
y
+H(g) + ζ(1− dAi )ΨA (4.3)
W iB(gB, rB,ΨB) = (y − gB − rB)
yi
y
+H(g) + ζdAi ΨB (4.4)
and will cast his vote for the candidate whose platform gives him the higher utility, given
his income, his political bias and the relative popularity of the two candidates. Thus a voter
6Linearity is assumed, but the results would not change using different (sub linear or super linear)
specifications.
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i will choose A if and only if:
W i(gA, rA,ΨA) > W
i(gB, rB,ΨB) + σ
i + δ (4.5)
The intuition behind this modeling choice is that voters attribute to each candidate the
merit to contribute to the enjoyment of participation (or to the disenchantment) according
to the level of electoral campaign made by each of them. However, following the stylized
fact discussed, they attribute more weight to the candidate that represent the party with
the ideological position nearer to their own than to the opponent.
Since δ is partially stochastic, the result of inequality 4.5 will be internalized by the
candidates in probabilistic terms, leading to a probabilistic voting model.
Figure 4.2: A voter i with income yi and political bias σ
i obtains, as a consequence of the
investments of the two candidates an additional (dis-)utility. The amount of utility that he
obtains from each of the candidates depends from the investments of the two candidates
and from his relative political bias. The latter is transformed in a value on the segment
[0, 1] (thick line) with a linear transformation. The proximity to each of the candidates will
then determine how much utility is gained (or lost) by i as a consequence of the investments
of that candidate. In this graphical example the voter i, being nearer to candidate A, will
obtain more utility (ζdBi ΨA) from him than from candidate B (ζd
A
i ΨB).
After the elections, one candidate, J, is elected and implements his platform. A general
voter i, with income yi and with bias σi will then obtain the following ex-post utility (see
Figure 4.2 for a graphical representation of how the third addend is formed):
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W iJ = (y − gJ − rJ)
yi
y
+H(g) + ζ(ΨA − dAi (ΨA + ΨB)) (4.6)
Finally, the timing of the model (summarized in Figure 4.3) is as follows:
1. The two candidates, simultaneously and non cooperatively, announce binding elec-
toral platforms qA = {gA, rA,ΨA} and qB = {gB, rB,ΨB} respectively. They make
their announcements knowing: the distribution of voters’ policy preferences (given by
F (yi)), the distribution of voters’ idiosyncratic bias σ
i and the natural distribution
of popularity δ˜ (as it would be if uninfluenced by the amount invested in political
advertisements);
2. The final distribution of δ is calculated using ΨA and ΨB decided in Step 1;
3. A value is extracted from δ and all uncertainty is resolved;
4. Elections are held, with voters knowing perfectly the platforms of the candidates and
their relative popularity;
5. The elected candidate implements his announced policy platform.
Figure 4.3: Timing of the model
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4.4 Results
We can now proceed to solve our model by backward induction. To this end, it is useful to
define what constitutes an equilibrium in this model.
Definition 1. An equilibrium is given by: q∗J = {g∗J , r∗J ,Ψ∗J} for J ∈ {A,B} such that
∀J : E[vJ(q∗J ; q∗−J)] ≥ E[vJ(qJ ; q∗−J)] for all feasible qJ and q−J , given voters policy pref-
erences, the distribution of voters’ idiosyncratic bias σi, the popularity distribution δ and
the fact that each voter will vote for the candidate that he likes the most i.e., solving
argmaxJ(WJ |qA, qB, σi, δ) 7
Without loss of generality, we can study the election probability (pA) for one of the
candidates, say A. The results for his opponent will be then given by 1 − pA. Since we
assume a competition between two candidates, the election probability of candidate A is
equal to the probability that the shares of votes (piA) he gets is bigger than one half. I.e.,






= Prob [σ ≥ 0] , (4.7)
where σ is the idiosyncratic bias of the swing voter, who is exactly indifferent between
the two candidates and for whom Equation 4.5 holds with equality. Given the informational
structure of our model, the swing voter is not necessarily (and in general he is not) the voter
with the median income. His identity is directly (through the utility function) influenced by
the platforms (g, r and Ψ) announced by the two candidates and indirectly by the effect of
political campaign (Ψ) on the overall distribution of possible popularities of the candidates.
Solving Equation 4.5, with equality, for σ we obtain the bias of the swing voter:
σ =
2(wA − wB) + ζ(ΨA −ΨB)− 2δ
2(1 + φζ(ΨA −ΨB)) (4.8)
7In this definition a variable indexed J indicates a choice variable of the candidate which is taking the
strategic decision, while a variable indexed −J refers to the choices of his opponent.
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where wA and wB (small case) are the welfares of the swing voter (as given by Equation
4.2) net of the direct utility from campaign expenditures. Equation 4.8, stresses the fact
that when ζ is positive, and the campaign generates utility, the identity of the swing voter
changes in the direction of the candidate that spends more thus generating more excitation
of participation. However, everything else being equal, when voters dislike the campaign,
the effect of the expenditures on the utility of voters makes the swing voter identity shift in
the direction of the candidate that spends less.
Plugging the utility function of the swing voter in Equation 4.7, and solving, we obtain















Using Equations 4.1 and 4.9, we can derive the response functions of the two candidates
and the equilibrium 8. We will describe in detail the derivations for candidate A, as this
gives useful insights in the structure of the model. The same reasoning applies to the other
candidate, yielding a symmetric equilibrium.









= H−1g (1) (4.10)
This implies that candidate A will always choose the level of public expenditures preferred
by the voter with average income. Given the symmetry of the model, we get the standard
result that:
Proposition 2. The candidates reach full policy convergence to the policy g∗ preferred by
the voter with average income.
8For the problem to be strictly concave (and thus, for the equilibrium to represent a maximum of the
candidates’ objective function), parameters must satisfy the following condition: for each candidate, it must
hold that (R+ γr) > − γ(Hg−1)2
Hgg
. This is always satisfied for a sufficiently prestigious office.
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The candidates are purely opportunistic, so they choose their economic policy simply
with the aim of maximizing the probability of election. Not having information on the
possible correlation between incomes and political bias of the voters they are unable to
target their policy to the effective preference of the median voter, so they choose instead its
expected position 9. Moreover, when the income distribution is positively skewed (i.e., the
society is composed of more poor than rich), Proposition 2 implies that the public good is
overproduced with respect to the preferences of the median voter.















Therefore, the probability of being elected is increasing in the total desirability of the
office (R + γrA) and in the degree of uncertainty of candidates about their own popularity
(Ω). This result match the observation of Polo (1998): uncertainty relaxes the electoral
competition so, everything else being equal, it increases the probability of election for any
given rA. Interestingly, pA is decreasing in the efficiency of transforming rent in utility.
Indeed, high γs create stronger incentives to extract rent from the budget, thus reducing the
voters’ appreciation of the candidate’s platform. Equation 4.12 shows that the campaign
costs that the politician is willing to pay are equal to the desirability of the office, weighted
for the marginal benefits of the electoral campaign (on the swing voter, through ζ, and on
the whole population through h), and by the level of uncertainty of the political competition.
The higher are those three factors, the higher are the expenses that the candidate is willing
to sustain to increase his probability of being elected.
9We explicitly exclude the case in which candidates are able to infer, from the income, the likely bias of
a voter, as it seems quite unrealistic.
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Solving Equation 4.11 for rA, we obtain rA =
1
ΩpA− Rγ . Thus, the rent extracted depends
positively on the probability of being elected, weighted by the degree of uncertainty of the
electoral outcome (a high Ω implies the less aggregate uncertainty and thus a more efficient
electoral competition, where the rent extraction is more costly in terms of votes lost). Finally,
R acts as a substitute for rA, whose weight is given by γ: candidates are willing to renounce
to some of their rents in order to have access to a more prestigious office. Exactly how much
they are willing to give up depends on the efficiency of rent extraction.
Since the campaign expenditures are a function of the probability of being elected only
through rA, we first concentrate on the latter. Making explicit the probability of election of




















Equation 4.13 shows that outspending the adversary increases the rent extractable.
Moreover, given the results of Proposition 2 (the policy convergence of the candidates),
Equation 4.13 (together with Equation 4.12) implies that rA(rB,ΨA,ΨB) - the rent of a
candidate depends only on the rent of the opponent and on the expenditures of both con-
tenders - and that ΨA(rA) - the expenditure of a candidate depends, directly, only on his
rent. So, for Ψ, the strategic responses to the opponent’s decisions act directly through the
rent and, only indirectly, through both the expenditures in campaign.









(ΨA −ΨB) + 1
2
rB (4.14)
Therefore, the extractable rent is a function of the sum of two components: one, non-
strategic, which depends only on the parameters and one which is a function of rent and
expenditures of the adversary and of own expenditures. Equation 4.14 tells us that the
candidates’ rents are a positive and linear function of each other. Indeed, the more one
candidate is planning to divert for private consumption, the more the opponent can extract
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without reducing his probability of being elected. Moreover, the expected gross rent is a
positive function of own campaign expenses and a negative function of those of the oppo-
nent. This last relationship uncovers the rationale of rent-seeking candidates for investing
in campaign. However, while out of equilibrium the effect of campaign in changing the pop-
ularity is twice more important than the effect on the procedural utility of the swing voter,
due to the symmetry of the model, under the assumption that ΨA = ΨB = Ψ, there is no
equilibrium effect of advertisements on expected rents. This result seems to confirm the
empirical observation of Levitt (1994): the absolute level of candidate’s expenses has little
effect on voter’s choices when the two competitors invest similar amounts of resources.
From Equations 4.12 and 4.14 we now calculate the reaction functions of candidate A to
























16− γΩ(2h+ ζ)2]. Assuming enough uncertainty 10, the candidate’s rent
is decreasing in the expenditures of the opponent and increasing in his rent. As already
pointed out, if a candidate increases the rent that he demands, the opponent can do the
same without affecting his election probability. However, when a candidate increases the size
of his own electoral campaign, he decreases the probability of the opponent to be elected
and, in expected terms, his rent.
Moreover, Equation 4.16 shows that the expenditures of one candidate are increasing
in the rent that the opponent extracts (since an increase in the rent of B allows A to do
the same and extract more money proportionally) and decreasing in his expenditures (more
expenditures of B means less expected rent for A, and therefore less expenditures).
10I.e., Ω < 16
γ(2h+ζ)2
.
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Knowing that, by the symmetry of the model, rA = rB and ΨA = ΨB, we can obtain











Therefore, we can conclude that in equilibrium:
Proposition 3. When the candidates are able to influence the voters with their investments




0, 12Ω − Rγ
]




0, γ8 (2h+ ζ)
]
. Thus, on
the one side, the extractable rent is increasing and concave in γ, decreasing and convex in Ω
and linearly decreasing in R and, on the other side, the equilibrium expenditure is linearly
increasing in h and γ and ζ.
Moreover, r∗ is ortogonal to Ψ∗.
Propositions 3 has several implications. The gross rent (r) is not influenced by the
possibility of doing an electoral campaign (indeed, it is equal to the one found by Polo,
1998). Thus our model predicts that corruption and campaign expenses, in absence of
special interest groups, should be uncorrelated. Empirically, when an increase of the second
variable is observed, there should not be a significative effect on the first one.
However, a positive part of the expected rent is, in our model, invested in electoral cam-
paign. The reason for this investment is, on one side, given by the possibility to overspend
the adversary, influence the distribution of the voters’ bias and therefore increase the chances
of being elected and, on the other side, by the attempt of creating enough participation ex-
citation to make some voters change side. In particular, the pressure to do active electoral
campaign (and therefore the amount spent) increases when both the channels to influence
the outcome are possible (and ζ > 0). Thus, Proposition 3 induces the following corollary.
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Corollary 4. If campaign spending affects positively the utility of the voters (ζ > 0), then
the electoral campaign increases in size as a proportion of the amount of resources extracted.
This is a result of the fact that collective excitation creates an additional incentive to
campaign as, to do so, allows to potentiality move more votes. Indeed, under the conditions
of Corollary 4, the electoral campaign increases the voters’ welfare due to the collective
excitation it generates.
Given the orthogonality of rents and campaign expenditures, the investment in the latter
effectively transfers some of the extracted rent back to the citizens (at least in a non-monetary
sense). Moreover, since both candidates spend an identical amount of money in equilibrium,
all the citizens, regardless of their idiosyncratic bias, enjoy the electoral campaign to the
same extent (though not all of them will be equally satisfied by the policy g chosen). In this
regard, investing in campaign is similar to pork barrel spending (a candidate’s promise of
diverting a - disproportionate - amount of resources in favor of the voters that elect him).
However, in this model, since the expenditures in electoral campaign are made before the
elections (and not just promised), they are enjoyed by the whole electorate, not just by the
voters of the candidate elected.
For candidates, doing an electoral campaign reduces welfare. Both of them would be
strictly better off not spending but, in this setting, they are unable to commit themselves to
this behavior. Therefore they find themselves in a Prisoner’s dilemma situation and they
both spend a significant amount of their expected rents in order to try to increase their
chances of winning.
How much still remains for the candidates, after the electoral campaigns are paid for, is
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As for the gross rent, the size of the net rent is increasing with the uncertainty about the
popularity while, clearly, an increase in the marginal effects of expenditures in campaigns
decreases the net rent. Finally, a decrease in the transaction cost γ has different effects on
the net rent, depending on the values it assumes. Indeed, rnet is an increasing function of
γ if γ >
√
8R
2h+ζ and a decreasing one otherwise. In this respect, notice that this threshold
moves toward the unity when the office becomes more prestigious. This implies that, for
very prestigious offices, a decrease in transaction cost always decreases the net rents (or leave
them equal to zero if rgross ≤ Ψ). An explanation for this phenomenon follows. If R is big,
competition is ceteris-paribus fierce, leaving little space for rent accumulation. However,
this also increases the pressure to maximize the probability of election with more spending.
In this condition, a decrease in the transaction cost makes the extraction of those little rent
more efficient. However the expenditures grow faster than the gross rent thus decreasing the
net rent.
Interestingly, Equation 4.19 shows that, under the conditions of corollary 4, the modern-
ization and higher penetration of mass media (which make every dollar spent more effective)
and better means of transport and campaigning (which allow voters to participate more
to campaigns and feel more involved) increases the efficiency of the electoral competition,
reducing the net rent of the candidate.
However, empirically this is not always observed. In some countries it has been shown
that a lot of additional information discouraged and disenfranchised voters, who feel less and
less involved in politics. Coherently, in this case, our model predicts an inverse relationship
between disenfranchisement of voters and campaign expenditures:
Corollary 5. If campaign spending affect negatively the utility of the voters (ζ < 0), candi-
dates reduce campaign expenses.
Indeed, in this case the rationale for campaign spending is reduced. While spending is
still useful to increase the probability of winning (through its effect on the electoral body as
CHAPTER 4. CAMPAIGN SPENDING AND RENTS IN A PROBABILISTIC VOTING
MODEL 110
a whole), it also affects negatively the perception of the platform of the candidate.
4.5 Welfare Analysis
We have shown that while the electoral competition, in the presence of uncertainty, leads
to positive gross rents, the candidates renounce to some of their rents in order to increase
the chances of winning the elections. Moreover, we have shown that the net rents decrease
when citizens utility is positively affected by campaign. However, some inefficiency in the
electoral competition remains as net rents can be positive. In this section, we study the
possibility of introducing public policies aimed at increasing efficiency.
The channel that has been explored by most of the literature on political advertisement
to achieve this objective is the application of expenditure limits. Under this policy, the
candidates are forbidden from investing in electoral campaign more than a given amount
of resources. This kind of policy can be effective when the funding of campaigns comes
from special interest groups but, in our setup such limitations are always welfare decreasing
for the voters and welfare increasing for the candidates. The proof is intuitive. When
voters enjoy the political campaign, reducing the maximum expenditures limit the amount
of rent channelled back to the public in the form of utility of participation, without affecting
corruption. Therefore the candidates are better off than in the absence of any limitation, but
the voters always have their utility reduced by this kind of policy. This result is clearly driven
the nature of our model where the candidates self-finance their own campaigns. Analogously,
when voters do not enjoy political campaigns (ζ < 0) spending limitations are useless, as
the candidates are already willing to reduce their expenses in order to avoid hurting their
electorate.
In a situation characterized by rent seeking candidates and by the absence of lobbies, a
better policy is one that reduces their ability to extract rents, fighting the corruption of the
political system, by abating the incentives to rent accumulation. Let us now assume that a
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constitutional level authority, or a international institution (that can impose its decisions on
the candidates and the politicians), imposes an additional tax on the citizens (called τγ in
the following) whose size is fixed exogenously. The revenues of this tax are used in order to
reinforce the judiciary and police system and to make it harder, for candidates, to extract
rents from the public budget, increasing the transaction cost associated to rent extraction
(i.e., reducing γ).
The model is therefore modified, introducing an additional proportional tax on voters’
income so that total taxation will now be equal to τ = g + r + τγ . Moreover, the expected
utility of each of the candidates will be pJ(R+(1− τγ)γrJ)−ψ2J 11 With this kind of policy,
while the choice of public services (g), remains fixed at the value preferred by the voter with









γ(2h+ ζ)(1− τγ) (4.21)
Given that 0 ≤ τγ ≤ 1, both the gross rents and the campaign expenditures are reduced
by this tax. Whether this policy also increases the efficiency of the political system (reducing
net rents), depends on the prestige of the office and on the level of taxation. Indeed:
Proposition 6. If the office is sufficiently prestigious, i.e. if R ≥ γ28 (2h + ζ), net rents
decrease at any level of taxation on corruption. However, if the office is not sufficiently
prestigious, then net rents decrease if τγ ≥ 1− 8Rγ2(2h+ζ) and increase otherwise.
The level of additional taxation required to reduce net rents increases with the effective-
ness of campaign and as the transaction costs decrease (since this creates stronger incentives
11This setup is the simplest possible. Indeed, the new tax reduces of 1− τγ units the utility obtained from
every unit of rent extracted. A richer specification could involve a generalization of this formula in which
the effectiveness of τγ is an arbitrary function f(τγ) such that f(0) = 1 and f(1) = 0. Furthermore, the




yidF (yi). This two additional elements would undoubtedly provide a larger wealth of results than those
provided here. However, in the interest of clarity and tractability of the results we leave these extensions for
future work.
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to accumulate rent), and decreases with the prestigiousness of the office. In other words, the
prestigiousness of the office acts as a substitute also for taxation on corruption (as discussed
in Section 4.4, R makes the electoral process more efficient in reducing the rent extraction).
Proposition 6 reflects the qualitative observation that, in countries where political offices
are considered more prestigious (or where the civil servant aspect of a politician’s job is
more important) the amount of resources (monetary but also in terms of the attention of
the public opinion) that needs to be dedicated to effectively fight corruption is more limited
than in countries where politicians command little respect.
In order to assess the welfare properties of this policy, we now study the threshold levels
of taxation that make each of the agents in this model better or worse off. For candidates,
it can be proven (see appendix 4.7) that, as a consequence of the previous discussion on the
net rents, it holds that:
Proposition 7. A moderate tax, introduced to fight the rent-seeking behavior, can actually
increase candidates’ utility. This happens when τγ < 2− 16Ω(2h+ζ)2γ ≡ τ c
This is a consequence of the form of the utility function of the candidates. When the
taxation is small, it reduces the incentives to rent extraction linearly, but it also abates the
campaign expenditures quadratically (the campaign costs are assumed to be convex). So,
while reducing the absolute size of corruption (gross rents), a moderate taxation also abates
expenditures, diminishing the competition between the candidates, which is beneficial for the
voters. As long as the candidates decide to make an active electoral campaign the trade-off
described remains and ,only if the campaign disappears, the level of taxation for which the
candidates are better off tends to zero. This result could also explain why some countries,
with high levels of corruption, engage in actives that pretend to fight the phenomenon. A
”cosmetic” anti-corruption policy may indeed help the politicians running for the office to
overcome part of the prisoner dilemma that makes them overspend in campaign. While
creating a fac¸ade of honesty these politicians would be actually working to improve their
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own welfare. Cases of failed corruption policies are widespread in particular in countries
where political offices command little or no prestige (see Riley, 1998). Therefore, a policy
maker who wants to adopt a tax of this kind, should take into account that if the office is
not very attractive, then a limited amount of taxation could actually increase the amount
of money that the candidates are able to extract being, de facto, counterproductive.
Let us now turn our attention to the effects of this tax on a given voter. The imposition
of an additional tax has three distinct effects: on one side it diminish the welfare of the
citizens, abating available income (yi) and it reduces (see Equation 4.21) the opportunities
of participation in political activities, on the other side, the elected candidate extracts a
smaller rent, increasing the welfare of the voter. The net balance of these variations of
welfare depends crucially on the value of the parameters and, in particular, on the gross
income of the citizen (yi). Indeed, it can be shown (see Appendix 4.7) that:
Proposition 8. When the tax is sufficiently big, τγ > 1 − 4Ryiγ(yζγ(2h+ζ)+4yi) , a voter with
income yi is better off as a result of taxation on corruption. However, if the office is not
sufficiently prestigious, i.e. R < (1− τγ)γ, then no voter is better off with the taxation.
As for every tax, some citizens will be made better off by it, while some other will lose
utility. Proposition 8 implies that each voter has a minimal level of taxation, below which
the anti-corruption fight worsens his position (see Figure 4.4).
Given this result, it is clear that not every citizen would be willing to support a costly
anti-corruption policy. Thus, also in the light of the result of Proposition 7, these results
could be interpreted as a partial solution, offered by politicians to the corruption problem.
Since only a part of the population is willing to pay to see corruption reduced, the candidates
could use this willingness to introduce ineffective reforms.
The result of Proposition 8 can be generalized to the whole electoral body. The overall
effect, on the electorate, of a tax-financed anti-corruption campaign is given by the difference
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W iτ>0 dyi −
∫ 1
0
W iτ=0 dyi (4.22)
The solution of Equation 4.22, yields (see Appendix 4.7 for details) the following proposition:
Proposition 9. The population of voters is overall better off with the introduction of a tax
on corruption if τγ > 1− 2Rγ(γζy(2h+ζ)+2) ≡ τv.
Everything else being constant, it is clear that an important role is played by y, the
average income of the electorate. The higher it is, the higher is the proportional tax rate 12
required for the population to be better off thanks to corruption-fight. This implies that
populations with an positively skewed income distribution will be, in principle, better off at
lower levels of taxation than a population with relatively more rich.
Will the median voter be better off with or without the taxes that make the whole
population better off? This question is relevant, since in most countries, popular support
for a policy that acts against the dominant class (here the political class) needs to be strong
to allow its implementation. Income distribution turns out to be pivotal in establishing
popular support for such measures. Indeed, it is possible to show (see Appendix 4.7) that:
Proposition 10. For any symmetric distribution the threshold of taxation on corruption
that makes the population better off is just equal to the one that makes the median voter
better off.
For any positively (resp. negatively) skewed distribution, at the threshold above which the
population is better off with the taxes, the median voter is worse (resp. better) off with the
taxes.
Proposition 10 offers an explanation of why, in countries with comparatively many poor
(where the median voter’s income is below the mean income), it is difficult to effectively
12Note that we assume the anti-corruption tax to be a proportional tax. Other types of tax schedule could
lead to different results
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Figure 4.4: Graphical representation of Proposition 8. The continuous line represents the
minimal tax rate necessary for a voter with income yi to increase his welfare. The dotted line
instead represents the tax rate above which the agent is better off without any government.
Therefore, the area between the two lines is the set of tax rates that makes the citizen better
off with the anti-corruption policy. Finally, the dashed line represents the level of taxation
on corruption that makes the population as a whole better off (from Proposition 9). At this
level, however, some citizens (the poorer ones) will be worse off with the tax.
implement anti-corruption policies of the kind proposed here. Indeed, when the median voter
is worse off with the policy, this implies that the level of taxation required to increase the
population welfare lacks the popular support needed for the implementation (in a democratic
country).
Propositions 7 and 9, taken together, indicate that there is a possible conflict of interest
between voters and politicians on the strength of the anti-corrution measures to imple-
ment. Indeed, putting together the two thresholds we obtain that τv > τ c if 0 < Ω <
64+16yζ(2h+ζ)γ
(2h+ζ)2(4R+γ(4+yζγ(2h+ζ)))
. When this condition is satisfied the choice of an amount of tax-
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ation between τv and τ c makes both of the sides better off. However when the condition is
not satisfied, the choice is between a level of taxation that makes one side worse off and a
level that decreases the welfare of both sides.
Finally, imagine that a benevolent social planner, before the game, has to set the optimal






(y − g − r − τγ) yi
y
+H(g) + 2ζΨ dyi (4.23)
Plugging in the equilibrium values from Equations 4.20 and 4.21 and solving the maximiza-




Rγ(2 + yζ(2h+ ζ)γ)
(4.24)
The social optimum in Equation 4.24 is always bigger than the threshold established by
Proposition 9, except when the ego-rent associate with the office is particularly low (i.e, if
R < γ2 [2 + yζγ(2h+ ζ)]). In this case, as already discussed, the anti-corruption tax is never
able to make the population better off, so the social planner chooses τ∗γ = 0. This condition
confirms how, in order to have efficient public policies it is pivotal to establish a minimum
level of prestige associated to the office to protect from corruption.
Summarizing, we have shown that the introduction of an anti-corruption tax can make
the citizens better off. Surprisingly, it may also make the candidates better off when the
gross rent that they extract decrease less than the expenditure in electoral campaign. We
finally establish the conditions under which a policy of this kind can achieve the popular
support required for an effective implementation.
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4.6 Conclusions
Our aim in this paper is to study the relationship between corruption and campaign ex-
penditures in a context characterized by the absence (or the limited relevance) of political
lobbies. To this end, we introduce several innovations on the classical framework of the
probabilistic voting models (Polo, 1998 and Persson & Tabellini, 2000), with office moti-
vated (rent-seeking) candidates and ideological voters. We explicitly model the campaign
spending of the candidates together with the multiple types of influences that it has on the
voting decisions of the population. A particular feature of our paper, that distinguishes it
from the current literature, is that we establish a direct link between electoral expenditures
of candidates and utility of voters. The utility changes (increasing or decreasing depending
on which stylized fact we want to capture) if voters observe that candidates are doing an
active electoral campaign.
Our main result is that rent extraction and campaign spending are orthogonal variables
in equilibrium. This allows us to predict, that in countries where lobbies have a limited role,
we should not find a significative relationship between the amount of resources invested in
campaign and the scale of corruption of the administration that gets elected. Moreover, we
find that in the majority of cases candidates spend a positive part of their expected rent in
order to finance their electoral campaign. In itself this result is a qualitative confirmation
of the realism of the model. Indeed, very rarely politicians abstain from doing electoral
campaign, even when they are forced to self-finance it. On this regard, our model produces
a testable prediction: when voters find electoral campaigns exciting, candidates spend more.
How to test this prediction? It is difficult to empirically disentangle the difference between
h, the effect of advertisement on the general population, and ζ, the effect of campaigning on
voter’s utility. A possible solution is to consider the level of technology and penetration of
mass media as proxies for h and the amount of campaign events in an geographical area as
a proxy for ζ. Indeed, mass media advertisements tend to affect a population equally, but
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do not lead to significative ”psychological gains” (Sanders, 2001) in terms of participation
opportunities to the election procedure. On the contrary, political rallies and opportunities
of employment in the campaign of a candidate, directly stimulate individual citizens to be
involved in the political process. Studying the differences between contested (where usually
most of the campaign events are concentrated) and uncontested electoral districts, it could
be possible (with an empirical strategy similar to the one proposed by Frey and Stutzer
2000, 2005) to estimate the effect of political campaigns on voters contentment with the
political system 13. While a large number of socio-economic controls should be added in
order to take into account the local specificities, this seems a promising way of testing our
results about ”campaign excitement”.
In this paper, we also study the effects of the introduction of public policies aimed at
reducing the inefficiencies of the electoral competition. In this respect, our model predicts
that campaign spending limitations are always welfare decreasing for the voters. This policy
should therefore be avoided, at least in contexts where special interest groups have a limited
importance. Another way of interpreting this result is to advice policy makers to forbid
completely contributions from organized groups as, when campaigns create utility, this policy
allows the electoral competition to increase the voters’ welfare, without the burden of the
policy costs implied by lobbies’ contributions.
An alternative policy we study is to fight corruption with investments in police and justice
financed by an additional tax paid by the electoral body. A policy of this type may reduce
the net rents (and therefore the inefficiency of the electoral competition) when the electoral
office to protect is highly prestigious. However, when this condition does not hold, this
policy can work in favor of corrupt politicians, increasing their utility. This result provides
a theoretical explanation for the behavior of many corrupt politicians who, in countries with
13Evidence of the fact that the opportunity of political participation (i.e. working, without wage, in a
candidate’s campaign) induces positive changes in voters perceived quality of life, or happiness, has been
shown by Weitz-Shapiro & Winters (2008) and by Pacheco & Lange (2010). For our purposes it would be
important to demonstrate the existence of an effect of political events, such as campaign rallies, on voter’s
perception of the political system (rather than simply on those that choose to participate to campaigns).
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high levels of public embezzlement, often introduce weak anti-corruption policies, that turn
out to help them increasing their rent through a reduction of the positive effects of electoral
competition. Some of the most problematic democracies, such as Bolivia, Venezuela, Senegal
and Russia, present clear examples where politicians claim to fight corruption but use this
policy to create a fac¸ade of honesty while still allowing themselves to retain a significative
share of the public budget for private consumption.
The last important result of this paper is that it uncovers a relationship between the
tax-level required, in a given population, to achieve welfare improvements through an anti-
corruption policy and the level of popular support that this policy requires in order to be
implemented in a democratic setup. We show that it is difficult to implement effective policies
in countries with large income inequalities, as in this case the majority of voters will oppose
the introduction of a (sufficiently effective) anti-corruption law. In these environments, only
an non-elective, external body can hope to reestablish efficiency.
While this paper still has some limitations, our setup is very flexible and, at this stage,
we are able to envision several ways to extend it. Regarding the effects of political campaign
on voters’ utility (the main innovation of this paper), with our parametrization, we are able
to capture the excitement that can be generated as well as the feeling of disenfranchisement
of voters due to excessive quantities of information. However, in this second case, a possible
effect of electoral campaign is neglected: as a consequence of too much information some
voters could decide not to participate to elections. Making the turnout endogenous, and
directly linking the voters’ (dis-)utility from campaign with their participation probability
could help us capturing an additional trade-off in the decisions of the candidates: the one
between the need to campaign in order to get a maximum of the participants’ votes and the
need to maximize the share of the population that goes to the ballots.
Finally, a more general specification of the anti-corruption tax, could generate richer
results in terms of welfare analysis. In this context, the introduction of re-election concerns
could create the disciplinary device required to induce politicians to apply effective anti-




Proof of Proposition 7
In the case of no tax on corruption the expected value of the candidates’ utility is given by
Equation 4.1, while introducing the tax on corruption, it becomes: pJ(R+(1−τγ)γrJ)−Ψ2J .
In equilibrium, given the symmetry of the model, the probability of being elected is always
equal to 12 . Introducing the relevant equilibrium values for r and Ψ (Equations 4.17 and 4.18
for the case without taxes and Equations 4.20 and 4.21 for the case with anti-corruption
taxes), we can now calculate the difference between the expected values in the two cases:
E(vτ>0j )− E(vτ=0j ) = −
γτγ(16− (2h+ ζ)2γΩ(2− τγ))
64Ω
(4.25)
We are interested to know under which conditions on τγ the candidates are better off (when
Equation 4.25 is positive). Requiring this equation to be bigger than zero and solving for
τγ , we find the result of Proposition 7.
Proof of Proposition 8
In the absence of anti corruption policies, the welfare of a citizen with income yi is given by
Equation 4.2 while, with the taxation it becomes: Wi = (y − g − r − τγ) yiy +H(g) + ζ(1−
dJi ΨJ . We can introduce the relevant equilibrium values for g, r and Ψ into the equations
of welfare and calculate the difference between the two expressions 14:
W
(τ>0)












14By the symmetry of the model ΨA = ΨB . Moreover, since d
A
i = 1− dBi , for every voter i, dAi + dBi = 1
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In order to compute the conditions for the voter i to be better off with the taxes, we impose








It is immediately evident that since the RHS of the last equation is always positive, if
R < γ(1 − τγ) then the inequality is never satisfied. Finally, solving Equation 4.27 for τγ
we obtain the other result of Proposition 8.
Proof of Proposition 9




















ζγ(2h+ ζ) dyi (4.28)


































2RΩ + γ(τγ − 1)(1 + yΩ(γζ(2h+ ζ)(τγ − 1)− 2) + 2τγΩ)
4yγΩ(1− τγ) (4.31)
To establish our result, we need that Wτ>0−Wτ=0 > 0. Solving this inequality for τγ yields
the condition summarized in Proposition 9.
Proof of Proposition 10
Consider a symmetric distribution of income between 0 and 1. By definition y = yM =
0.5. Therefore, the threshold taxation that makes the median voter better of (the one of
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Proposition 8 with yi = y
M = 0.5) becomes:
τγ > 1− 2R
γ(0.5γζ(2h+ ζ) + 2)
(4.32)
which, given that yM = y, is equal to the level of taxation that makes the whole population
better off (see Proposition 9).
Consider now a positively skewed distribution bounded between zero and one 15. For
any such distribution yM < y < 0.5. Proceeding as above we can find the threshold that
makes the median voter better off:
τMγ > 1−
4RyM
γ(yγζ(2h+ ζ) + 4yM )
(4.33)
From Proposition 9 we know the threshold of the population (let us call it τPγ ). We want to
show that, at τPγ , the median voter is worse off with the taxes. For this to be true it must
hold that his threshold is higher than the one of the population: τMγ > τ
P
γ . This inequality
is satisfied for yM < 12 . Since we know that for every positively skewed distribution between
0 and 1, yM < y < 0.5, the inequality is always satisfied. In the same way, since for any
negatively skewed distribution yM > y > 0.5, we can prove that the median voter is always
better off with taxes at the level at which the population is indifferent.
15The Kumaraswamy Distribution is an example of this kind of distribution.
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